









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Grajales Olarte, A. (2018). Essays on nominal rigidities: Identification, macrodynamic consequences and policy
implications. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Essays on Nominal Rigidities: Identification,






Essays on Nominal Rigidities: Identification, Macrodynamic Consequences and
Policy Implications
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University op
gezag van de rector magnificus, prof.dr. E.H.L. Aarts, in het openbaar te verdedi-
gen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen com-
missie in de Aula van de Universiteit op dinsdag 20 november 2018 om 14.00 uur
door
Anderson Grajales-Olarte
geboren te Bogotá, Colombia.
iv
Promotiecommissie:
Promotor: prof. dr. S. C. W. Eijffinger
Copromotor: dr. B. R. Uras
Overige Leden: prof. dr. H. P. Huizinga
dr. L. B. D. Raes
dr. D. Pfajfar
dr. A. C. Bertay
Acknowledgments
This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and sup-
port of my supervisors, prof. dr. Eijffinger and dr. Uras. The conversations I
had with Professor Eijffinger were constructive in the process of molding my re-
search questions to make them more interesting from the point of view of eco-
nomic policy. Thanks to these discussions my analyzes, besides the theoretical
and conceptual rigidity, also have a component of policy implications I hope will
contribute and help inform decision making.
I want to thank especially dr. Uras. Burak not only accepted me as his Ph.D.
student when I was struggling to find a research topic, but his supervision was im-
peccable from my point of view. I admire Burak’s incredible work capacity (how
to forget the Sunday emails at 11:00 pm with proposals, suggestions, and com-
ments) and his ability to organize the research and its results in such a way that
the contribution was more visible. I learned a lot from him during the dozens
of meetings we had, which were only possible thanks to his almost permanent
availability to discuss academic topics, but also personal issues for which his ad-
vice was extremely valuable. I am happy and proud to have had the opportunity
to work in the last four years with such an intelligent and kind person.
I am immensely grateful to my two supervisors.
I also want to thank the members of my Ph.D. Committee: prof. dr. H. P.
Huizinga, dr. L. B. D. Raes, dr. D. Pfajfar and dr. A. C. Bertay. Their questions,
comments, and suggestions contributed significantly to the improvement of this
dissertation. Many of the recommendations I received from them will be the seed
of future research I hope will bear fruit soon.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of the
University of Tilburg. I take this opportunity to thank all the members of the De-
partment of Economics under the leadership of prof. dr. R. Gerlagh and prof. dr.
J. Boone, to all professors, lecturers and administrative staff. In the same way, I
thank the Central Bank of Colombia. Without the financial support of this insti-
tution none of this would have been possible.
v
vi
I can not fail to thank all the people I met during my Ph.D. studies. Unfortu-
nately, I can not name them all, but I want to highlight especially Loes, Michal,
Vatsalya, Roxana, Mitzi, Fiona, Laura, Santiago, Richard, Carlos, Mauricio, and
Victor; I will remember with great affection our conversations and the shared
lunches. I thank Di Gong, with whom I briefly shared an office and with whom I
had contact for the first time, and at first hand, with the Job Market process and
whose advice I still have in mind. To Hasan, for being an excellent office part-
ner. During the hundreds of days we shared office he was a silent companion
when work absorbed us and silence was necessary, but with much to say at times
when we could afford to rest. I will always remember the pleasant conversations
we had, not only in academic subjects, but in others as varied as mathematics,
physics, and even nutrition, in which Hasan always had an interesting opinion.
To Khulan, for being my teammate during the Research Master. In those early
years, when the level of study intensity was often overwhelming, having her help
and support made life easier and happier for me. To Sophie, who despite arriving
when my Ph.D. studies were already quite advanced, quickly became an essen-
tial member of the Department, but more importantly, within my small group of
friends. I will miss that coffee we had in the afternoons.
I want to thank the friends who accompanied me in the distance. To Jennifer,
whose frequent messages shortened the distance and whose support throughout
this process was invaluable. Also, because she was the most constant companion
in my summer trips. Impossible to ignore Natalia, my great friend from when we
were just beginning the study of economics and who has always offered me a
different perspective in academic and personal matters. How to forget so many
heated arguments that made me think and, as she would say, open the mind. I
would also like to thank John Jairo, Luis Guillermo and Maira for their support
and company.
Finally, I want to thank my family for their support, in particular: to my mom,
Mery, for her daily prayers. On more than one occasion that extra help was the
push I needed to continue. To Valentina, whom we thank for her efforts to raise
the family during our most challenging period. To Leonardo because his moti-
vation and the energy he invests in achieving his goals and his desire to dedicate
his life only to things that excite him are inspiring. To Claudia and Steve because
without the distance celebrations that they organized my birthdays would not
have been the same. To Diana and Gladys because their support was essential
to start this process. And to Sergio, because he contributed, always proposing
something to do, to make my visits to Colombia for Christmas more fun.
vii
But especially I want to thank my sister, Nathalie, because her conversations
and daily messages never let me feel alone and gave joy to my life. There were
countless laughs and good times shared, his funny comments about the most
mundane things, and that way of his, half in mockery, half seriously, to motivate
me and encourage me when I felt my strength faltered.




2 Heterogeneity in Wage Setting Behavior in a New-Keynesian Model 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Evidence of heterogeneity in price and wage setting . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Wage Rigidity and Business Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.1 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1.1 Sticky prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1.2 Sticky information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.1.3 Flexible price sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1.4 Rule-of-thumb firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1.5 Aggregate price inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2.1 Sticky wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2.2 Sticky information in wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.2.3 Flexible wages sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.2.4 Rule-of-thumb wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.2.5 Aggregate wage inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.3 Monetary authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.4 Equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.1 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.2 Implications of Wage Setting Heterogeneity for Monetary
and Technology Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.2.1 Monetary Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.2.2 Technology Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
ix
x CONTENTS
2.6.3 Conclusions for monetary policy and wage flexibility . . . . . 39
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.1 Summary of the equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.2 Convergence test for the simulated chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.8.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Stability and Welfare Effects of Increasing Wage Flexibility in the Pres-
ence of Financially Constrained Households 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.1.1 Ricardian households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.1.2 Hand-to-mouth households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.2 Labor supply and wage setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.3 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3.1 Final good sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3.2 Intermediate sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.4 Price setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.5 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.6 Monetary authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.7 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.8 Parameterization and solution strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Dynamic responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.1 Positive Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.2 Negative Demand Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.3 Positive labor and investment shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.4 Summary of the dynamic responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6.1 Response to a positive monetary shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6.2 Response to a positive government shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4 Rigid Wages & Contracts: Time- vs. State-Dependent Wages in the
Netherlands 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Theories of Wage Rigidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
CONTENTS xi
4.3 Institutional Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Wage Rigidity: Descriptive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.6 Wage Rigidity: Time- and State-Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6.1 Results: Time- vs. State-dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.6.2 Results: Time- vs. State-dependency and contracts . . . . . . 116
4.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.8.1 Additional figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.8.2 Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
xii CONTENTS
List of Figures
2.1 IRF for output gap after a monetary shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 IRF for price inflation after a monetary shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 IRF for wage inflation after a monetary shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 IRF for nominal interest rate after a monetary shock . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 IRF for output gap after a technology shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 IRF for price inflation after a technology shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7 IRF for wage inflation after a technology shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8 IRF for nominal interest rate after a technology shock . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 Response to a positive productivity shock - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Response to a positive productivity shock - II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Response to a positive productivity shock - III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Response to a negative demand shock - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Response to a negative demand shock - II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Response to a negative demand shock - III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Response to a positive labor shock - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.8 Response to a positive labor shock - II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.9 Response to a positive labor shock - III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.10 Response to a positive investment shock - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.11 Response to a positive investment shock - II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.12 Welfare losses: wage flexibility and hand-to-mouth households . . 77
3.13 Welfare losses: wage an price flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.14 Welfare losses: wage flexibility and nominal interest rate response
to inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.15 Response to a positive monetary shock - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.16 Response to a positive monetary shock - II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.17 Response to a positive government shock - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.18 Response to a positive government shock - II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
xiii
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
4.1 Raw and adjusted wage trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Hazard function of wage changes - Raw data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 Hazard function of wage changes - Adjusted data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 Months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5 Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6 Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.7 Participation of age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.8 Business size (number of employees) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.9 Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.10 Participation of flexible and fixed contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.11 Participation of tenured and untenured contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.12 Weekly contract hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.13 Type of job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.14 Share of "on-call" in the total number of workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.15 Macroeconomic series for The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
List of Tables
2.1 Priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Estimated values for the HpHw model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Specification for the six models to estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Estimated values for the six models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5 Model comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 Geweke convergence test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Parameters for the structural equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Parameters for the shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1 Composition of fixed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2 Wage rigidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.6 Business size (number of employees) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.7 Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.8 Weekly contract hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.9 Type of job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.10 Probability of a wage increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.11 Probability of a wage reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.12 Probability of wage increases by type of contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.13 Probability of wage reductions by type of contract . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.14 Distribution of contracts based on wage trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.15 Distribution of contracts based on observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.16 Number of observations lost in each step of the data cleaning pro-
cess (5% sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.17 Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
xv
xvi LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 1
Introduction
Most economists agree that, in the long run, changes in nominal variables such
as the money supply or the nominal interest rate do not affect real economic ac-
tivity. In this sense, it is well established that changes in the money supply by the
monetary authority only influence the long-term price level and not the quantity
of goods and services produced. In this context, money can be considered as a
veil, and therefore, as established by the classical dichotomy, nominal and real
variables can, in principle, be studied separately since the behavior of the former
can be understood independently of the behavior of the latter.
This dichotomy does not apply in the short term. Empirical research dating
back to at least the middle of the last century, of which Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) is perhaps the most influential, shows evidence of a (at least statistical) re-
lationship between nominal and real variables when their behavior is considered
for periods of time relatively short, for example, a couple of months or quarters.
Specifically, during these short periods of time, associated with economic cycles,
several authors, using different econometric approaches, have found a positive
correlation between the different monetary aggregates and also the nominal in-
terest rates with the real output. The real short-term impact of these nominal
variables, which to some extent are controlled by the monetary authority, opens
the window to stabilization policies that motivate interventions aimed at coun-
teracting the deviation of economic activity from its long term. For these stabiliz-
ing interventions to be successful, however, a deep understanding of the mech-
anism that generates the short-term link between nominal and real variables is
required.
From the theoretical point of view, recent macroeconomic models rational-
ize the real effect of nominal variables by considering nominal and real frictions
in the economy. New-Keynesian models, which have proved capable of repro-
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
ducing stylized facts observed in actual economies, depart from the neoclassical
assumptions of total flexibility in the goods and labor markets and of unimpeded
adjustments of prices and wages. Instead, these models assume that firms and
workers have differentiated goods and labor and, therefore, interact in a market
characterized by monopolistic competition that allows them to establish their
prices and wages.
Firms and households, however, can not set their prices or wages without re-
strictions. In this way, in addition to the real rigidity represented by the character-
istic of the markets, and as empirical evidence suggests, New-Keynesian models
assume that prices and wages cannot be freely set in each period, but instead
are rigid in the sense that they remain constant for a certain period. With rigid
prices, the monetary authority can influence real activity by changing nominal
variables. The combination of real and nominal rigidities allows, for example,
that after a negative demand shock that brings output below its long-term level,
the monetary authority can respond by reducing the nominal interest rate. This
change in its policy instrument, when (at least some) prices remain fixed, trans-
lates into a change in the real interest rate which, in turn, affects the real side of
the economy, helping output to return to its long-term level.
The presence of rigidities in nominal wages has additional relevance in itself
for at least three reasons. (i) The lack of flexibility of nominal wages, given its
effect on real wages, hinders the ability of the labor market to adjust quickly to
changes in economic conditions, thus generating non-optimal allocations of re-
sources that may affect welfare. (ii) Several authors have found that including
wage rigidities in New-Keynesian models improves the fit to the data and also
contributes to the generation of impulse-responses that are more realistic. For
example, Woodford (2003) shows that, without rigidity in nominal wages, real
wages show a too abrupt response after a tightening of the monetary policy, even
in the presence of price rigidity. In addition, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005) found that, in terms of data fitting, incorporating nominal wage rigidity
is more important than considering price rigidity. (iii) The presence of nomi-
nal wage rigidity has non-trivial implications for optimal monetary policy. As we
know, in a scenario with only price rigidity, the optimal monetary policy corre-
sponds to the objective of total stabilization of price inflation. In a scenario of
rigidity of nominal wages, in addition to rigidity of prices, Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (2000) showed that this is no longer the case. The optimal monetary policy,
in this case, should focus on the stabilization of inflation of both prices and wages
since fluctuations in both prices and wages have detrimental effects on welfare.
3
This dissertation aims to shed light on the identification, measurement,
macrodynamic consequences and policy implications of nominal wage rigidity.
The first two chapter of this dissertation deals with the modeling and impact of
nominal wage rigidity from a theoretical/quantitative point of view.
In Chapter 2, entitled “Heterogeneity in Wage Setting Behavior in a New-
Keynesian Model”, a joint work with Sylvester Eijffinger and Burak Uras, we
estimate a New-Keynesian DSGE model with heterogeneity in price and wage
setting behavior. In a recent study, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) develop a
DSGE model, in which firms follow four different types of price setting schemes:
sticky prices, sticky information, rule-of-thumb, or flexible prices. We enrich
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) framework by incorporating heterogeneity
in nominal wage setting behavior among households. We solve this DSGE model
and estimate it using Bayesian techniques for the United States economy from
1955 to 2008. The estimation results show the relevance of heterogeneity in wage
setting among households. More importantly, we identify qualitative and quan-
titative business cycle features allowed by the heterogeneity in wage rigidity,
such as the persistence in price and wage inflation, which a standard New Key-
nesian model with only Calvo-type wage rigidity fails to achieve. We also show
that modeling wage rigidity heterogeneity - as oppose to standard-Calvo-wages
- amplifies the macroeconomic output fluctuations resulting from a technology
shock while it mitigates the output fluctuations following a monetary tightening.
In Chapter 3, entitled “Stability and Welfare Effects of Increasing Wage Flexi-
bility in the Presence of Financially Constrained Households” I analyze the stabil-
ity and welfare effects of greater wage flexibility in an economy where a fraction
of households do not have access to financial markets. I propose a medium-sized
New Keynesian DSGE model and use it to investigate the effects of the interaction
of these two frictions. The results show that once we consider limited asset mar-
ket participation, greater wage flexibility increases the volatility of key macroeco-
nomic variables. The volatility increases, even more, when the zero lower bound
restricts the monetary policy. Regarding welfare, the analysis reveals that, in a
context of limited asset market participation, greater wage flexibility is welfare
improving only for implausible initial high degrees of wage rigidity; even in that
case the gains are small. Except that extreme case, greater wage flexibility consid-
erably reduces welfare when even a small fraction of households are financially
constrained.
The study of wage rigidity would have only theoretical interest in the absence
of evidence on the presence of this nominal rigidity in actual economies. The last
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chapter of this dissertation provides evidence of the rigidity of nominal wage and
its determinants for the Netherlands.
Specifically, in Chapter 4, entitled “Rigid Wages & Contracts: Time- vs.
State-Dependent Wages in the Netherlands”, a joint work with Burak Uras and
Nathanael Vellekoop, we study nominal wage rigidity in the Netherlands dur-
ing the Great Recession. The data we use has three unique features: (1) high-
frequency (monthly), (2) high-quality (administrative records), and (3) high cov-
erage (the universe of workers and the universe of firms). We find substantial
heterogeneity in the frequency of wage changes due to explicit terms of the labor
contract. Contracts featuring flexible hours, overtime hours and contracts with
a fixed period have a higher probability of a change in the contract wage. As
a second finding, we report substantial heterogeneity in the wage rigidity be-
tween industries as well as differences within the year and between years. We
estimate hazard models for the duration of a change in the contract wage, and
confirm earlier findings in the literature that the hazard has two spikes, one at
12 months and one at 24 months. Moreover, we found that wage changes have
a time and state dependency component. Once we split the sample based on
contract characteristics, we find that the response of wage changes to the time
and state component is heterogeneous across the different type of contracts.
This heterogeneity is particularly evident in flexible-hours, tenured, full-time
and part-time contracts.
Chapter 2
Heterogeneity in Wage Setting
Behavior in a New-Keynesian
Model
This chapter is based on a joint work with Sylvester Eijffinger and Burak Uras.
2.1 Introduction
It is well-documented that DSGE models require nominal rigidities (besides real
frictions) to fit the data better and to replicate the dynamics observed in styl-
ized facts. In particular, to generate the observed persistence in output and infla-
tion, nominal rigidities are necessary (Woodford, 2003). Macroeconomists usu-
ally include nominal rigidities— which differentiate NK models from Real Busi-
ness Cycle models— through an exogenous price-setting behavior of firms and
wage setting behavior of households. For instance, the widely applied nominal
rigidity scheme proposed by Calvo (1983) assumes that in every period only a
fraction of randomly selected agents is allowed to set their prices or wages.1 This
approach, despite its convenience, is unappealing for two reasons. First, Calvo-
type nominal rigidity leaves the mechanism unexplained by which a subset of
firms are allowed to re-optimize their prices (or the wages for the case of house-
holds), while others are unable to do so.2 Second, the underlying assumption
of the Calvo scheme, in which agents that re-optimize their prices or wages, re-
1There is a profusion of literature on DSGE models using the Calvo scheme for prices and wages,
with Smets and Wouters (2007) being one of the most influential.
2The same dynamic for price inflation could be obtained using a model with stronger microe-
conomics linkages given by quadratic cost of price adjustment, as in Rotemberg (1982).
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optimize at the same time, is at odds with the behavior of firms and as workers
observed in microdata.
Alternative approaches have been proposed in the DSGE literature to address
the above-mentioned two limitations of the Calvo scheme. These alternatives in-
clude, for example, the use of state-dependent pricing and modeling of the nom-
inal frictions using information rigidities instead of price rigidities; and, the uti-
lization of more general specifications, which maintain the Calvo approach but
incorporate some refinements and extensions to increase modeling flexibility. To
this end, for instance, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) suggest that modeling
an economy by assuming a uniform price setting rule across firms has non-trivial
consequences. In particular, consequences related to the ability of the model to
fit the data, and, more importantly, for the determination of optimal monetary
policy.
Our paper is related to this latter strand of literature and its contribution is
twofold. First, we complement the studies dealing with the general equilibrium
implications of heterogeneity in nominal rigidities. This is achieved by allowing
heterogeneity in prices akin to Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and extend-
ing their specification simultaneously to the wage setting heterogeneity among
households. Specifically, we develop a New Keynesian DSGE model where firms
and households are divided into four types and use their monopolistic power to
set prices and wages according to four different rules. The rules we consider are:
Sticky prices a la Calvo, sticky information, full flexibility, and indexation. We use
Bayesian techniques to estimate the model for the United States economy for the
period of 1955-2008, when the zero-lower bound was not binding. We also esti-
mate alternative model specifications, where nominal-rigidity heterogeneity is
considered only partially for prices as well as wages. The second contribution of
our work is related to the use of the estimated models to investigate the macroe-
conomic impact of the heterogeneity in prices and wages over the business cycle
—as in e.g., Aoki (2001), Carvalho (2006) and Stahlschmidt (2007).
Our key estimation results can be summarized as follows: We find that about
90% of firms follow Calvo-type price stickiness or informational stickiness when
setting their prices - a quantitative result matching the findings of Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2011). As a novel finding of this paper, we show that at the
household side only a total of 58% of the workers set their wages via Calvo-type
wage stickiness or information stickiness. Therefore, the estimation results point
out that wage-rigidity heterogeneity is more apparent than price heterogeneity
when using a New-Keynesian model in matching the aggregate data. To delin-
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eate further on the dimension of heterogeneity, we find that over 20% of the
households follow a flexible-wage rule, while the estimated population frac-
tion of flexible price setters turns out to be only 5%. We also show that the model
which incorporates heterogeneity in both wage and price setting behavior fits the
data the best among a number of alternative models whose quantitative prop-
erties we evaluate. These findings contrast with the standard way of modeling
wage determination where 100% of the households follow a Calvo sticky rule and
more importantly, they cast doubts on modeling price and wage setting behavior
symmetrically via standard Calvo setting. In this regard, our results show that
although the assumption of all firms setting their prices according to a Calvo rule
could be reasonable, extending this assumption to wage determination appears
to be not appropriate when matching data.
We then conduct a business cycle analysis using the estimated model to dis-
tinguish the business cycle properties generated by wage-rigidity heterogeneity
from standard New-Keynesian models. We identify interesting qualitative busi-
ness cycle dynamics generated by the heterogeneity in wage rigidity, such as
price and wage inflation persistence following monetary contractions that are
prevalent characteristics of the business cycle data. Standard models with only
Calvo-type wage rigidity fail to match such business cycle properties. Moreover,
the impulse-responses reveal that allowing heterogeneity in wage rigidity ampli-
fies the macroeconomic output fluctuations resulting from a technology shock
whereas it mitigates the output fluctuations following a monetary tightening. As
another key result we also show that models which do not incorporate any wage
rigidity, generate implausible fluctuations of macroeconomic variables, such as
for wage inflation.
Based on our findings, a key policy-relevant conclusion from the analysis is
that the heterogeneity in wage staggeredness proves to be an important chan-
nel through which nominal rigidities could determine the level of monetary pol-
icy effectiveness. In this respect, our paper contributes to the growing literature
aimed to understand the relevance of wage determination for the macroecon-
omy. Two important papers in this literature are Galí (2013) and Galí and Mona-
celli (2014). While Galí (2013) shows that in the context of a closed economy
model, macroeconomic consequences of wage rigidities depend on the type of
the monetary policy rule, Galí and Monacelli (2014) study the gains from wage
flexibility for the case of an open economy and show that an increase in wage
flexibility could reduce welfare - especially in economies under an exchange rate
peg. We contribute to this important policy debate by emphasizing that it is not
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only the overall level of labor market flexibility but also its sectoral composition
what matters for the macroeconomic policymaking.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 pro-
vides a summary of empirical findings regarding heterogeneity in price and wage
setting behavior. Section 2.3 summarizes some findings about the relevance of
wage rigidity for business cycles. In section 2.4, the model specification, its log-
linear form, and equilibrium conditions are sketched. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 dis-
cuss the estimation methodology and present quantitative results, respectively,
while in section 2.7, concluding remarks and suggestions for further research are
presented.
2.2 Evidence of heterogeneity in price and wage setting
Extensive empirical literature shows that the price setting behavior is not ho-
mogeneous across firms and shows considerable variability. This variability de-
pends on factors like the firm size, economies of scope or the existence of explicit
or implicit contracts which impede even minor adjustments in prices.
Similarly, firms can be reluctant to change prices guided by the notion that
consumers could wrongly relate a reduction in price with a reduction in the qual-
ity of the products, deterring in this way downward correction in prices. In addi-
tion, competition stances or failures in coordination among firms could make a
firm not willing to change the price of its products for fear that competitors will
not do the same. Finally, different pricing behavior could be a consequence of the
traditionally studied implication of high costs (menu costs) for changing prices,
which are different among firms (Hoeberichts and Stokman, 2006).3,4
One study that is particularly relevant for this paper is Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2011), where the authors solve and estimate a traditional NK DSGE
model with flexible wages but heterogeneity in the price setting behavior among
3An interesting paper by Sheedy (2010) shows that allowing for heterogeneity in price deter-
mination generates an intrinsic persistence in aggregate inflation without the need to appeal to
backward-looking pricing rules. The author achieves this result by moving away from the tradi-
tional assumption of random selection of firms that can adjust their prices and, instead, by as-
suming that the hazard function for changes in prices has a positive slope. We are not aware of a
similar implementation for the case of the determination of wages, but this could suggest an ad-
ditional channel through which the heterogeneity in the setting of wages is relevant for business
cycles and monetary policy.
4A non-exhaustive list of papers dealing with heterogeneity in price setting behavior includes:
Alvarez et al. (2006), Angeloni et al. (2006), Aoki (2001), Bils and Klenow (2004), Carlsson and Skans
(2012), Carvalho (2006), Dhyne et al. (2006), Goldberg and Hellerstein (2009), Hoeberichts and
Stokman (2006), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Middleditch (2010), Midrigan (2011), Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) and Vermeulen et al. (2012).
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firms. In particular, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) consider that the econ-
omy is composed of four sectors whose only difference is the constraint (or lack
of it) faced when setting prices. The four sectors considered are firms that use
traditional sticky prices a la Calvo, firms that face sticky information, those that
adjust their prices every period according to the last period’s inflation, and firms
that have flexible prices. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) find that this kind
of heterogeneity in prices improves the data fit performance of the model (cast-
ing doubts on specifications that only include one kind of rigidity or none at all).
Also, the authors find that the non-consideration of the heterogeneity can hinder
the task of the monetary authority and complicate the achievement of its stabi-
lization objectives.
In contrast with a large body of literature dealing with heterogeneity in the
rigidity of prices among firms, there are relatively fewer papers that empirically
investigate heterogeneity in wage setting behavior. The scarcity of research on
this topic was due to a great extent to the lack of appropriate data. Recently, high-
frequency wage data become increasingly available - leading to a new strand of
research to gain momentum. For example, in the case of France, using survey
data from 1998 to 2005, Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) find evidence of
heterogeneity in the frequency of wage adjustments across sectors, occupations,
and firm size. The authors also show a seasonal pattern in wage changes, which
are more likely to occur in the first quarter. Besides the usual downward rigidity,
the paper also finds a non-flat hazard function for wages having a peak in the
fourth quarter.5
In a similar vein, using monthly administrative data from Luxemburg for the
period of 2001-2006, Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) find high heterogeneity in
wage flexibility for the nearly 11.000 firms considered in the sample. The authors
show that the heterogeneity can be explained by firm size, whether the firm is
private or public, and by industry. The authors also document a clear seasonal
pattern for changes in wages, clustered in January and October.6
Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2012) found similar results by conducting an
empirical analysis using administrative monthly data for Iceland between 1998
and 2010. The authors find evidence of heterogeneity in wage flexibility across
industries and occupations and strong support for this heterogeneity based on
5Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) findings indicate that wages are more rigid in the service
sector, especially for managers, and in firms with 20-49 employees. The authors show that wages
closer to the minimum wage are more likely to change in the third quarter.
6Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) find that wage changes are more frequent for civil servants and
white-collar workers.
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firm size.7 Additionally, the authors also show evidence of a seasonal pattern in
the changes in wages, with nominal wages tending to increase in January and
June.
Complementing these findings, Druant et al. (2012) find evidence of het-
erogeneity in wage rigidity across sectors based on survey information from
the Wage Dynamic Network initiative for 17 European countries. In particu-
lar, the authors illustrate that wages change more frequently in construction,
for larger firms and where the share of white-collar workers is small while are
least frequent in trade and market services. Besides, their findings also suggest
that competitive pressures within the sector are not relevant for wage flexibil-
ity. Concerning the seasonal pattern of wage changes, the paper documents a
clear cluster of firms that change their wages principally in January, followed by
a smaller cluster changing their prices in July.8 Finally, the authors uncover a
strong synchronization between price and wage changes.
Research regarding heterogeneity in wages for the United States has been
scarce. Nonetheless, Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) documented hetero-
geneity in the flexibility of wage setting for the U.S. between 1996 and 2004. Using
data for four-month periods (infra-annual frequency) based on the results of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the authors show that wages
are stickier in the manufacturing sector and more flexible in agriculture, mining,
and services. Similarly, wages are less flexible for workers in managerial occupa-
tions compared with workers in direct production. As in other studies, the au-
thors uncover empirical evidence of a seasonal pattern in the frequency of wage
adjustments - that the frequency of wage changes is slightly higher in the second
half of the year, and that the hazard function of a nominal wage is not constant,
having a peak at 12 months. This behavior of the hazard function contradicts the
Calvo framework.
Studies that include wage heterogeneity in macroeconomic models comple-
ment the evidence mentioned above. Particularly with respect to the seasonal
pattern, Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) use a VAR model and find that in quarters
where wages are more flexible (3rd and 4th), the responses of GDP and GDP defla-
7Regarding industries, Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2012) findings reveal that wages are more
flexible in transport and trade - and relatively more rigid in financial services. Regarding occupa-
tions, the analysis points out to lower rigidity in sales and support positions and higher rigidity
for the managerial level. With regard to firm size, bigger firms tend to change their wages more
frequently than smaller firms.
8Druant et al. (2012) find that the share of white-collar workers is positively associated with
wage stickiness. The authors also show that the sectors that more clearly show a seasonal pattern
in their wage adjustments are market and financial services, while construction is the sector with
the least clear pattern.
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tor after a monetary shock are weaker than in quarters where wages are less flex-
ible. In contrast to traditional specifications within the Calvo framework, Olivei
and Tenreyro (2007) assume that the probability of resetting wages is different
in each quarter (calibrating this probability according to the empirical data for
the United States). The authors show that this extended DSGE model generates
impulse responses that quantitatively match those found in the actual data. In
contrast to Olivei and Tenreyro (2007), where the seasonal heterogeneity is ad-
dressed, Dixon and Bihan (2012) investigate the effects of heterogeneity in the
rigidity of wages across industries. Using data from France, the authors calibrate
two independent variations for nominal rigidities: a so-called Generalized Taylor
Economy (GTE), where firms have wage spells of different durations, and a Gen-
eralized Calvo Economy (GCE), where firms have different probabilities of reset-
ting their wage (price). As the authors highlight, these two mechanisms “allow
the distribution of durations implied by the pricing model to be exactly the same
as the distribution found in the actual micro-data.” Dixon and Bihan (2012) find
that after including these general specifications, the model can replicate the per-
sistence of inflation and output observed in data. The authors also show that the
GTE specification can generate a hump-shaped response of inflation and out-
put that is not present in the standard Calvo framework - but widely observed in
Business Cycle data.
Pfajfar and de Ridder (2017) found that heterogeneity in the rigidity of nom-
inal wages across U.S. states has important effects on the propagation of mon-
etary and fiscal shocks. Using microdata from the Current Population Survey,
the authors calculate state-level downward nominal wage rigidity between 1980
and 2007 finding that, in states with a high degree of wage rigidity, contractionary
monetary policy and tax shocks increase unemployment and decrease economic
activity to a larger extent compared to states with more flexible wages. Intrigu-
ingly, the authors found an asymmetry in the effect of wage rigidities on the im-
pact of shocks. Specifically, Pfajfar and de Ridder (2017) found that the degree
of wage rigidity only affects contractionary shocks while the expansionary ones
have little effect on real variables.
2.3 Wage Rigidity and Business Cycles
Several studies highlight the importance of staggered wage adjustments - along-
side nominal price rigidities - in explaining business cycle data.9 For instance,
9An extended treatment can be found in Woodford (2003).
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Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) document that real wages are acyclical - or at best slightly pro-
cyclical, implying that any New-Keynesian model with nominal price frictions
is consistent with business cycle real wage data if it incorporates nominal wage
rigidities. Similarly, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) criticize sticky-
price flexible-wage models because they imply an implausibly sharp real-wage
decline after a negative monetary shock. Furthermore, Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), Altig et al. (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2007) find out that
models that incorporate both wage and price stickiness do a better job fitting the
impulse responses - observed in the data - following a monetary shock.
Regarding the persistence, Andersen (1998) and Huang and Liu (1999) have
argued that sticky wages generate more persistent real effects after a monetary
perturbation compared to models of sticky prices. Finally, the model with both
wage and price stickiness can capture richer wage dynamics vis-à-vis a model
with flexible wages.
These arguments rationalize the incorporation of nominal wage frictions in
a New-Keynesian DSGE framework alongside incomplete nominal price adjust-
ments. In this paper, we aim to model and estimate business cycle implications
of the heterogeneity in simultaneous nominal adjustment frictions in wages and
prices.
2.4 The model
Let us consider the following New-Keynesian Economy. There are three types of
agents: households, firms, and a monetary authority. Firms and households in-
teract in a framework of monopolistic competition in labor provision and in pro-
duction. There is heterogeneity in the way firms set their prices and the house-
holds set their wages. Specifically, four different rules for setting prices and wages
are considered among firms as well as among households. This contrasts with
traditional specifications used, e.g., in Smets and Wouters (2007), where stag-
gered price and wage setting behavior - a la Calvo (1983) - is homogeneous across
all economic agents.
Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) we assume that firms are di-
vided into four types. Firms following a standard Calvo (1983) scheme, which set
their prices by taking into account the likelihood of not being able to re-optimize
in the following period. Firms that follow a scheme of sticky information a la
Mankiw and Reis (2002) and therefore set their prices in every period but do it
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using an outdated information set. Firms with flexible prices, which set prices
optimally in every period; and finally, firms following a rule-of-thumb which set
prices mimicking the aggregate price inflation of the previous period.
We deviate from Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) by assuming that the
above-mentioned four types of rules are also present in the case of wage setting
among a distribution of heterogeneous household/workers who offer differen-
tiated labor services to firms. This specification, therefore, makes it possible to
encompass the heterogeneity in price and wage setting behavior simultaneously
- as observed in the empirical data, which we discussed in the previous section.
The key features of our model are presented below.10
2.4.1 Firms
There is a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], producing differentiated prod-
ucts using the following decreasing returns to scale production function,
Yt (i ) = At Nt (i )
1−α.
Firms share the same total productivity, which in log terms follows the AR(1) pro-
cess at =ρa at−1+εat . In this setup (1−α) represents the elasticity of production
with respect to labor while










corresponds to an index of labor input, with Nt (i , j ) being the demand of labor
type j by firm i and εw measures the elasticity of substitution between labor
types. The labor types, which will be defined below, belong to households dif-
fering in their wage setting rules - with sticky wages, sticky information in wages,
flexible wages and full indexed wages. It should be noted that, in this model,
each firm uses all types of labor. Standard first-order conditions to the end of the
production factor yield the demand for a particular type of labor as
Nt (i , j ) =Nt (i )

Wt ( j )
Wt
−εw
10The solution and estimation of the model was done using Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011). The
code is available upon request.
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Firms use their monopolistic power to set product prices. In order to model
the heterogeneity in the price setting behavior, we assume that there are four dif-
ferent “sectors” of the economy and that each sector sets the price of its product
following a different rule. In particular, two sectors face rigidities: a fraction s
p
s p
of firms follows a Calvo pricing mechanism (sticky prices), while a fraction s
p
s i
follows a sticky information approach. Additionally, a fraction s
p
f l of firms sets
prices in a flexible way, while a share s
p
r o t of firms adjusts prices following a rule-
of-thumb approach. Within the latter group, firms set prices according to the
price inflation observed in the previous period.
2.4.1.1 Sticky prices
In the sector with sticky prices, firms follow a Calvo pricing mechanism. This
means that in each period the probability of changing prices is (1− θc p ) where
θc p is the probability of being unable to do so. The objective of these firms is to
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Y (i )t+k |t

, (2.1)
where Qt ,t+k is the stochastic discount factor (see the household problem below)
and Ψ(i )t+k is the total nominal cost. Firms optimize subject to the demand for
their product, which is given by








where εp measures the elasticity of substitution between products and Ct is ag-























11Market clearing in the goods market requires Yt =Ct .
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whereψt+k |t is the nominal marginal cost. After log-linearization, the following
equation is obtained (hereafter, small caps represent the log of the variables and
variables without time index represent steady state values):
p
∗s p




βkθ kc p Et

m c (i )t+k |t +pt+k

, (2.2)
where m c (i )t+k |t is the log of the real marginal cost for firm i , and µp = −m c =
1
εp−1 . In Equation (2.2) the optimal price depends on the real marginal cost of a
particular firm, which is different from the aggregate real marginal cost given that
the production function exhibits decreasing return to scale. It is possible to re-
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(2.3)

















where it is clear that firms that do not optimize in a given period leave their prices
unchanged. Equation (2.4) can be used to calculate the log-linear version of price
inflation in this sector as
π
p ,s p









Then, using the optimal price found in (2.3), we get
π
p ,s p
t =βEt [πt+1] +
(θc p −1)
θc p
Θ(βθc p −1)dm c t ,
or in terms of the output gap eyt = yt − y nt , where the superscript n denotes
variables in their natural level without nominal rigidities, and the real wage gap



































Equation (2.5) corresponds to the standard New Keynesian Philips curve.
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2.4.1.2 Sticky information
Following Mankiw and Reis (2002), in a given period only a fraction (1−θi p ) of the
firms in the sticky information sector update their information, while the remain-
ing θi p fraction does not, so the new information takes time to reach all firms. In
this scenario, the aggregate price for the sector is








t− j ,t , (2.6)
where p s it− j ,t is the price set in period t using the outdated information from t − j .
Thus, θi p is a measure of the degree of information stickiness in the sectors, i.e.
if θi p = 0 no firms use old information.
Denoting
¦
P s it ,t+k
©∞
k=0
as the future prices for a firm, which revises its price








P s it ,t+k Y (i )t+k −Ψ(i )k+t (Y (i )t+k )
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subject to the demand for its product,
Y (i )t+k =Ct+k
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The solution to this problem is of the form
P s it ,t+k =
εp
εp −1
Et [M C (i )t+k +Pt+k ] ,
for k = 0, 1, 2, .... Log-linerization yields







which, together with the aggregate price for this sector (Equation (2.6)) provides
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According to Equation (2.7), price inflation for firms with informational fric-
tions is a weighted sum of expectations of the current price inflation for up to J
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past periods, changes in the real wage gap, and changes in the output gap. In
order to make this specification implementable, we set J = 8.12
2.4.1.3 Flexible price sector
In the flexible price sector, all firms optimize prices in every period. In this case,
each firm has a one-period objective function and the optimal price in log terms
is given by p ∗t =m c (i )t −m c +pt , while the sectoral inflation is
π















α−1 and dm c t =
m c t −m c =
αeyt
α−1 − eωt , we derive the sectoral inflation rate as:
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Firms in the rule-of-thumb sector set their prices according to the prevailing
price inflation rate in the previous period. Therefore, the inflation rate in this
sector is simply given by:
π




2.4.1.5 Aggregate price inflation



















p ,r o t
t . (2.9)
It is worth to mention that in our framework sectoral inflation rates are de-
pendent on the aggregate price inflation.13
12By construction, the number of past periods considered goes to infinity. The value chosen for J
was determined for a technical reason related to the increasingly computational burden associated
with higher values for J in the estimation process. As noted by Verona and Wolters (2013), in papers
dealing with sticky information, the truncation point ranges from 3 to 252 periods.
13In order to guarantee that the estimated values for the share of each sector are between zero
and one and add to 1, in the estimation step bs ps p , bs
p
s i and bs
p
f l were considered. Therefore s
p
s p = bs
p
s p ,




1− bs ps p
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bs ps p −1

 
bs ps i −1

and s pr o t =

1− bs ps p

 
bs ps i −1


bs pf l −1

. In spite of this, the
reported values presented below corresponds to the shares in (2.9).
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2.4.2 Households
There is a continuum of household/workers indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] who maximize





β t U (Ct ( j ), Nt ( j ))

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The instantaneous utility of each household is represented by









whereσ andφ denote the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively. Households value a consumption
index given by











The consumption decision is a standard two-stage problem where in the first









Pt (i )1−εp d i

1
1−εp . In the second stage the household maximizes its
utility function with respect to the consumption index and labor subject to the
budget constraint Pt Ct ( j ) +Qt Bt ≤ Bt−1 +Wt Nt +Tt , where Bt−1 is the number
of bonds purchased in the previous period, Qt =
1
1+it
is the price of the bond and
Tt is a lump-sum transfer representing taxes and dividends.
14
The solution to the second stage problem yields the standard first-order con-
ditions, which in log terms are expressed as
wt −pt =σct +φnt , (2.11)













where it =− lnQt and ρ =− lnβ .
Given that households have monopolistic power over their differentiated la-
bor they can set their wage rate. By analogy to the case of the price-setting behav-
ior of firms, we assume heterogeneity in wage setting where different fractions of
households set their wages following different types of rules. Specifically, a frac-
tion s ws p of all households follows a Calvo mechanism (sticky wages) while another
14Bonds are riskless and have a one period maturity, i.e. each bond bought at period t pays one
unit of money at t +1. In the model bonds are in zero net supply. Taxes are set to zero because we
did not model the government.
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fraction s ws i follows a sticky information approach. Additionally, a fraction s
w
f l is
allowed to set flexible wages while the remaining s wr o t adjust wages according the
rate of wage inflation observed in the previous period. We label this latter group
as rule-of-thumb households.
2.4.2.1 Sticky wages
Following a Calvo scheme, in every period only a fraction (1−θc w ) of the house-
holds in the sticky wage sector can change their wages while the remaining θc w






βkθ kc w U (Ct+k |t , Nt+k |t )

,
with respect to W ∗s wt subject to the constraints given by the demand for labor
and the budget constraint,










≤Dt+k |t +W ∗s wt Nt+k |t −Tt+k .
The solution to this problem is




















where M RSt = −
uN
uc
is the marginal rate of substitution. In log terms, the equa-
tion for the optimal wage in the sticky-wage sector then becomes









+βθc w Et w
∗s w
t+1 ,
with bµw ,t = µw ,t −µw and µw ,t = (wt −pt )−m r st . We can express the wage in-
flation for this sector as in the following:
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2.4.2.2 Sticky information in wages
With sticky information in wages, the household chooses the following wage path







yielding an aggregate wage rate for the sector as








t− j ,t ,
which allows us to calculate the wage inflation for the sticky information sector
as




























According to Equation (2.13), wage inflation for households with informa-
tional frictions is a weighted sum of expectations of the current wage inflation
for up to J past periods, changes in the real wage gap and in the output gap. As
in the case of sticky information in prices we set J = 8.
2.4.2.3 Flexible wages sector
In order to calculate the optimal wage in the flexible wage sector, the easiest pro-
cedure is to solve an objective similar to the one with sticky wages but by ac-
knowledging that the objective is now a one-period program. The solution to
this program yields the following wage inflation for the flexible-wages sector:
π













In the rule-of-thumb wages sector, households set their wages according to the
wage inflation rate observed in the previous period. Therefore, the wage inflation
in this sector is simply given by
πw ,r o tt =π
w
t−1.
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2.4.2.5 Aggregate wage inflation
Analogously to the price case, the aggregate wage inflation is computed as the
















w ,r o t
t .
2.4.3 Monetary authority
Following Galí (2008), we assume that the policy rule is such that the monetary
authority takes into account and responds to the deviations of output from its
natural level and also to the evolution of price and wage inflation. In this respect,










where the disturbance term is an AR(1) process with νt = ενt . The parameter λ
captures the degree of interest rate smoothing.16
2.4.4 Equilibrium conditions
The derivation of the IS curve completes the model. This relation is derived, in
output gap terms, using the Euler equation of the household (2.12) together with


















where the output gap - eyt = yt − y nt - is measured with respect to the natural
output and the production level prevailing in the absence of nominal rigidities is
given by y nt =ψ
n











Additionally, the natural interest rate is defined as r nt = ρ +σψ
n
y a Et∆at+1,
while the natural wage follows w nt = ψ
n
w a at + ϑ
n







φ−ασ+α+σ . Finally, wage and price inflations are linked according
to wt =wt−1+πwt −π
p
t . The complete model consist of 18 endogenous variables
(byt , y
n
t , yt , r
n




t , wt , w
n





p , f l
t , π






15The remarks in footnote 13 also apply in this case.
16The inclusion of wage inflation in the Taylor Rule is based on the notion that it is convenient
that the Central Bank reacts to all the nominal rigidities observed in the economy, in the case of the
paper at hand, rigidities in prices and in wages (Galí, 2008). In this regard, Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (2000) and Amato and Laubach (2003a) found that it is desirable for the monetary policy, in
the framework of simple interest rate rules, to respond to both price inflation and wage inflation.
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π
w , f l
t , π
w ,r o t
t ), 26 parameters (σ, α, ρ, φp , φw , φy , ρa , ρν, σa , σν, β , θc p , θi p ,
εp , θc w , θi w , εw , φ, λ, s
p
s p , s
p
s i , s
p
f l , s
w
s p , s
w
s i , s
w
f l , µp ) and two exogenous process
(at and νt ). A list of all the equations of the model is available in Appendix 2.8.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
In order to investigate the empirical implications of the heterogeneity in wage
and price setting behavior we estimate the model using Bayesian techniques.
We utilize the Bayesian estimation methodology because of the well-known ad-
vantages of this full information procedure over other estimation methods. On
the one hand, Bayesian techniques allow performing the estimation using pre-
sample information stemming from data or past research. The pre-sample in-
formation, which is included in the estimation procedure as priors for the dis-
tribution of the parameters, is difficult to accommodate in classical estimation
methodologies like Maximum Likelihood or Generalized Method of Moments.
The pre-sample information is highly valuable because it helps to improve the
identification of the parameters (DeJong, Ingram and Whiteman, 2000). On the
other hand, Bayesian methodology, being a full information procedure, appears
more appealing than procedures based on limited information such as the Sim-
ulated Method of Moments (McFadden, 1989) or a calibration exercise. The ad-
vantage over the former is that because Simulated Method of Moments is based
only on a limited number of moments, and the disadvantage of calibration is that
it lacks a formal statistical foundation (Kim and Pagan, 1999).
At an arguably deeper level, the main advantage of the Bayesian approach is
its direct quantification of uncertainty. In other words, the Bayesian approach
helps to make transparent the fact that in essence, all models are false. The
Bayesian approach, therefore, takes into account the uncertainty associated
with the parameters of the model and with the possible misspecification of the
model itself. This in turn, as discussed by Gelman et al. (2014), facilitates the
fitting to data of complicated models with several parameters and multilayer
probability specifications. In addition, but not less important, given that in the
Bayesian approach the parameters to be estimated are random variables, the
"confidence intervals" have an intuitive interpretation that contrasts with that
provided in the frequentist paradigm.17
17A brief description of Bayesian Methods and their application in DSGE models can be found
in Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and An and Schorfheide (2007). A textbook approach is available
in Canova (2007) and DeJong and Dave (2011).
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We estimate the benchmark model with heterogeneity in prices and wages
(hereafter the HpHw model) based on the standard priors used in the literature
(Table 2.1). Specifically, mean, standard error, and the distribution for the elas-
ticity of production with respect to labor (1−α), the parameters governing the
reaction of the monetary policy with respect to the output gap (φy ), to price in-
flation (φp ) and the degree of interest rate smoothing (λ) were set according to
Smets and Wouters (2007). The standard error and the distribution for the in-
verse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ) are also based on Smets
and Wouters (2007). The prior mean for this parameter, however, was set accord-
ing to Galí (2008) who assumes log-utility for consumer’s preferences. Regarding
the standard deviation of technology and policy shocks as well as the standard
deviation of the measurement errors in the output gap and in wage inflation we
take the priors from Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2001). The parameters mea-
suring the degree of price and wage stickiness a la Calvo (θc p and θc w ) follow a
Beta distribution with a mean that incorporates the finding in the literature that
wages tend to be less flexible than prices. By symmetry, the priors for the pa-
rameters governing information rigidity in prices and wages (θi p and θi w ) were
set alike the Calvo case. Similarly, the autoregressive parameter for the evolution
of the technology process (ρa ) has the first and second moments as in Smets
and Wouters (2007). Finally, the population share of each sector - with respect to
price and wage setting behavior - is assumed to be equal to 0.25 with standard
deviations of 0.15.18 We do not estimate some of the parameters because they
present problems for the identification of our model. To this end, we set the Fr-
ish elasticity of the labor supply (φ) to 1 as in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
and the discount factor to 0.99 as in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2001). Finally,
the elasticity of substitution between goods and labor is set according to Smets
and Wouters (2007).
Following the tradition in the literature, we allow for measurement error for
output gap and wage inflation.19 We have a total number of 4 shocks in the
model. Hence, when estimating we use four observed variables: output gap,
price inflation, wage inflation, and nominal interest rate. Our sample covers
1955:1 to 2008:4 in quarterly periodicity for the United States. We explicitly
excluded the data after 2008, when the zero-lower bound was active, to avoid
18This choice is based on the lack of information on the share of each of the four ways of setting
prices and wages. We choose an equal prior share for each price and wage setting behavior to allow
the estimation of the shares to start from a level playing field.
19Sargent (1989) and Karagedikli et al. (2010) discuss the importance of measurement error in
improving the fit of DSGE models. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) include measurement er-
rors to absorb short-term fluctuations that are not modeled by the structural shocks.
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Table 2.1: Priors
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard error
β Fixed 0.99 –
σ Gamma 1 0.375
φ Fixed 1 –
α Normal 0.3 0.05
εw Fixed 10 –
εp Fixed 10 –
θc w Beta 0.75 0.1
θc p Beta 0.6 0.1
θi w Beta 0.75 0.1
θi p Beta 0.6 0.1
φp Normal 1.5 0.25
φw Normal 0.5 0.05
φy Normal 0.12 0.05
ρa Beta 0.5 0.2
s
p
s p Beta 0.25 0.15
s
p
s i Beta 0.25 0.15
s
p
f l Beta 0.25 0.15
s ws p Beta 0.25 0.15
s ws i Beta 0.25 0.15
s wf l Beta 0.25 0.15
λ Beta 0.75 0.1
σa Inverse Gamma 0.005 ∞
σν Inverse Gamma 0.005 ∞
σmey Inverse Gamma 0.002 ∞
σmeπw Inverse Gamma 0.002 ∞
Note: The parameters are: Discount factor (β ), Frish elasticity (φ), inverse of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (σ), elasticity of production with respect to labor (1−α), elasticity of sub-
stitution for products (εp ), elasticity of substitution for labor types (εw ), rigidity in wages a la Calvo
(θc w ), rigidity in prices a la Calvo (θc p ), information rigidity in wages (θi w ), information rigidity in
prices (θi p ), reaction to price inflation (φp ), reaction to wage inflation (φw ), reaction to output
gap (φy ), persistence for technology process (ρa ), nominal interest rate smoothing (λ), share of
firms with sticky prices (s ps p ), share of firms with sticky information in prices (s
p
s i ), share of firms
with flexible prices (s pf l ), share of firms with rule-of-thumb prices (s
p
r o t ), share of households with
sticky wages (s ws p ), share of households with sticky information in wages (s
w
s i ), share of households
with flexible wages (s wf l ), share of households with rule-of-thumb wages (s
w
r o t ), standard deviation
for technology process (σa ), standard deviation for monetary process (σν), standard deviation for
measurement error in output gap (σmey ) and standard deviation for measurement error in wage
inflation (σmeπw ).
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potential bias in the estimated parameters.20 Except for the interest rate, we
transform all variables using the natural logarithm and detrend them using the
method proposed by Hamilton (2017). Specifically, stationarity is obtained by
calculating, for a generic variable yt , vt+h = yt+h − yt with h = 8, given that we
have quarterly periodicity.21 All data observations are from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis database.
In our Bayesian estimation we use one chain - composed of 250.000 draws,
50.000 of which are discarded during the burning period. To check the stability
of the chain, Geweke (1999) procedure was implemented. As it can be seen in
Appendix 2.8, all parameters exhibit substantial convergence. The acceptance
rate is 24.4%, which is sufficiently close to what it is considered optimal (around
one forth, Koop (2003)).22 The (theoretical) identification of all structural com-
ponents are checked using the local identification analysis described by Iskrev
(2010).
2.6 Results
In this section we provide the estimation results for our reference mode, and for
a variety of alternative models. We also show the impulse-responses that allow
us to understand the macroeconomic relevance of the heterogeneity in wage-
setting behavior.
2.6.1 Estimation Results
Table 2.2 presents the estimation results for the posterior distributions of the
benchmark model with heterogeneity in price and wage setting. In general, our
20Hirose and Inoue (2015) found that in linearized DSGE models that do not consider the zero-
lower bound, the estimated parameters could be biased depending on the probability of hitting the
zero-lower bound and the duration of its spell. As a robustness check we also estimated the model
using the sample 1995:1 to 2014:1 finding no significant changes in the estimated parameters nor
in the response of the variables to the shocks.
21This detrending method avoids the introduction of spurious dynamic relations in the de-
trended variable (a well-known issue of other methods e.g. the Hodrick-Prescott filter) and there-
fore “consistently estimates well-defined population characteristics for a broad class of possible
data-generating processes” Hamilton (2017). As proposed by Hamilton (2017), we also stationar-
ized the variables using yt − β̂0 − β̂1 yt−8 − β̂2 yt−9 − β̂3 yt−10 − β̂4 yt−11, obtaining similar results. We
opted for vt+h = yt+h − yt because it does not depend on future observations of yt and thus it has
the convenience of one-sided approaches.
22We also estimate models using two chains with 500,000 replications each and an acceptance
rate of about 1/3. The results are similar to those presented in this section. In addition, the uni-
variate and multivariate convergence diagnosis of Brooks and Gelman show convergence for the
80% interval, the second and the third moment of the distribution. The results are available upon
request.
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estimates are in line with what other studies have found. For most parameters,
the mean and the standard deviation of the prior distribution differ greatly from
the corresponding moments of the posterior distribution. This difference is par-
ticularly evident for the parameters that measure the share of the different pricing
and wage behaviors. A result like this indicates that the data is informative in the
estimation of the subsequent distributions.
Regarding the estimated values, the model exhibits a value for the elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution of 0.21, which is similar to the value found by
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2001) and in between what was found by Andrés,
López-Salido and Nelson (2005) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005). The
elasticity of production with respect to labor (1−α) closely matches the values
previously estimated in the literature for the United States. Although we used dif-
ferent priors when estimating the degrees of price and wage stickiness a la Calvo,
the estimated values end up being very similar to each other. The average du-
ration of contracts with Calvo is 4 and 3.9 quarters for wages and prices, respec-
tively. These values are comparable to what is usually found in the literature,
e.g., they are within the boundaries estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005). These average durations are also similar to the findings in Smets
and Wouters (2007) for wages and the findings in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez
(2001) for prices. With respect to information rigidity, the estimated values show
that this is more pronounced for prices and less pronounced to wages compared
to the traditional rigidity a la Calvo. In particular, wage and price contracts with
informational frictions have average durations of 4.7 and 2.6 quarters, respec-
tively.23 With regard to the parameter capturing the persistence of the technol-
ogy disturbance process, the estimated value is in line with the estimates argued
by others in the literature. In particular, the technology process shows very high
persistence, highly consistent with the findings of Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez
(2005) and Galí (2008).
The estimation results indicate that a majority of the firms (85%) set their
prices according to the Calvo rule. This high population estimate for Calvo-pricer
firms can be confirmed with the findings of several papers in the literature, such
as Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Carlsson
and Skans (2012). Regarding the Calvo-rule, the estimate to the end of house-
holds’ wage setting behavior is somewhat different: while Calvo-wage setters are
also the majority of households, their population ratio (28% of the households)
23In comparison, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) found and average duration for price con-
tracts with informational frictions ranging from 4 to 20 quarters.
2.6. RESULTS 27
Table 2.2: Estimated values for the HpHw model
Parameter Mean Standard Deviation LB UB
σ 4.760 0.450 4.133 5.449
α 0.386 0.050 0.303 0.467
θc w 0.747 0.100 0.590 0.910
θc p 0.743 0.048 0.664 0.821
θi w 0.786 0.098 0.636 0.941
θi p 0.617 0.091 0.466 0.766
φp 1.505 0.218 1.138 1.852
φw 0.477 0.051 0.392 0.559
φy 0.106 0.049 0.029 0.189
ρa 0.782 0.032 0.733 0.838
s
p
s p 0.846 0.052 – –
s
p
s i 0.054 0.032 – –
s
p
f l 0.054 0.026 – –
s
p
r o t 0.047 0.020 – –
s ws p 0.278 0.177 – –
s ws i 0.184 0.081 – –
s wf l 0.275 0.090 – –
s wr o t 0.262 0.098 – –
λ 0.830 0.017 0.802 0.858
σa 0.033 0.004 0.027 0.040
σν 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.004
σmey 0.035 0.002 0.032 0.038
σmeπw 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.009
Note: The parameters are: inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ), elasticity of
production with respect to labor (1− α), rigidity in wages a la Calvo (θc w ), rigidity in prices a la
Calvo (θc p ), information rigidity in wages (θi w ), information rigidity in prices (θi p ), reaction to
price inflation (φp ), reaction to wage inflation (φw ), reaction to output gap (φy ), persistence for
technology process (ρa ), nominal interest rate smoothing (λ), share of firms with sticky prices
(s ps p ), share of firms with sticky information in prices (s
p
s i ), share of firms with flexible prices (s
p
f l ),
share of firms with rule-of-thumb prices (s pr o t ), share of households with sticky wages (s
w
s p ), share
of households with sticky information in wages (s ws i ), share of households with flexible wages (s
w
f l ),
share of households with rule-of-thumb wages (s wr o t ), standard deviation for technology process
(σa ), standard deviation for monetary process (σν), standard deviation for measurement error in




method is used to calculate the standard deviation of the parameters measuring the share of firms
and households. LB and UB stand for the Lower Bound and the Upper Bound of the 90% HPD
interval.
28 CHAPTER 2. HETEROGENEITY IN WAGE SETTING BEHAVIOR
is much lower than that of the Calvo-pricer firms. Both in terms of prices and
wages, the share of agents who use the sticky information is relatively small -
where the fraction is smaller for price setters (5%) than wage setters (18%). An-
other interesting estimate that we document is that compared to prices, wages
appear to be more flexible given that 27% of households set their wages using the
flexible wage setting rule compared to a population-ratio of flexible price setter-
firms of 5%. Finally, the share of the households with indexed wages (26%) is
greater than the corresponding fraction for indexed price setters (5%). These
findings allow us to argue that regarding modeling heterogeneity of nominal-
rigidities, households’ wage setting heterogeneity is much more prevalent than
firms’ price setting heterogeneity when estimating a New-Keynesian model with
aggregate data. This means a uniform Calvo price-setting rule could be a good
representation for firms, but more heterogeneity appears to be relevant to the
end of households.
In order to investigate the macroeconomic implications of the heterogene-
ity in price and wage setting behavior, we estimate five alternative models in
addition to the benchmark Heterogeneous-Prices-Heterogenous-Wages (HpHw)
model. Specifically, we estimate two models of flexible wage setting - one where
heterogeneity in price setting (a model labeled as HpFw) is assumed and another
one with only Calvo type price setting (labeled as CpFw). Additionally, we esti-
mate two other models where wages are set a la Calvo. In one case of this second
group, all price setters follow a Calvo scheme as well (labeled as CpCw) and in
another case we allow for heterogeneity in the price setting behavior (labeled as
HpCw). Finally, we also estimate a model where prices are flexible while there
is heterogeneity in the wage setting behavior (labeled as FpHw). As Table 2.3 il-
lustrates, the restricted specifications can be derived from the general model by
fixing some corresponding parameters.
Table 2.4 presents the parameter estimates for all six models, which also in-
cludes our benchmark with heterogeneity in wage and price setting (HpHw). In
general, and despite the differences in specifications, the estimated parameter
values are comparable across models. Examples of the parameters that are ro-
bust to different specifications are the degree of information stickiness for prices
and the parameter measuring the reactions of the monetary policy to changes in
the output gap. The stability of the estimates for the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution across models with rigidity in prices is also noteworthy. The aver-
age duration of price contracts a la Calvo ranges from 1.8 to 3.5 quarters while
for price information rigidities the interval goes from 2.2 to 2.8 quarters. In this
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Table 2.3: Specification for the six models to estimate
Setting behavior Shares
Model Prices Wages Firms Household
HpHw Heterogeneity Heterogeneity All estimated All estimated
HpFw Heterogeneity Flexible All estimated s wf l = 1
CpCw À la Calvo À la Calvo s
p
s p = 1 s ws p = 1
CpFw À la Calvo Flexible s
p
s p = 1 s wf l = 1
HpCw Heterogeneity À la Calvo All estimated s ws p = 1
FpHw Flexible Heterogeneity s
p
f l = 1 All estimated
Note: In the acronyms of the models: H-Heterogeneity, C-Calvo, F-Flexible, p-Prices and w-Wages.
Then, for example, HpFw corresponds to a model with Heterogeneity in Prices and Flexible Wages.
The relevant parameters for this table are: share of firms with sticky prices (s ps p ), share of firms with
sticky information in prices (s ps i ), share of firms with flexible prices (s
p
f l ), share of firms with rule-
of-thumb prices (s pr o t ), share of households with sticky wages (s
w
s p ), share of households with sticky
information in wages (s ws i ), share of households with flexible wages (s
w
f l ) and share of households
with rule-of-thumb wages (s wr o t ).
respect, we find that overall, Calvo price stickiness is higher in models that incor-
porate heterogeneity in prices, and the estimate of this kind of price stickiness
becomes higher when the heterogeneity is extended to wages. Average Calvo
wage contract duration, in turn, gets estimated values between 2.8 and 6.2 quar-
ters and, as in the case of price duration, it becomes higher once we allow for
heterogeneity in the manner in which wages are set. It is also worth noting that
even though the priors in the three models that take into account Calvo stick-
iness in prices and wages (HpHw, CpCw and HpCw) come along with a greater
stickiness in wages than in prices, the estimated posteriors for models CpCw and
HpCw show the opposite result. This is in contrast with findings in the literature
e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and
Galí, Smets and Wouters (2012), but is in line with the degree of stickiness found,
for example, by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2001), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez
(2005), Rabanal (2007) and De Graeve (2008).
In Table 2.4 we can also observe that there is a large variance in the parameter
estimates measuring the reaction of the monetary policy rule with respect to the
changes in price inflation. To this end, it is clear that in models where wages
and/or prices are assumed to be flexible, the reaction to price inflation is almost
50% greater than in models where some kind of rigidity is considered in wages.
One of the main advantages of models with nominal rigidity heterogeneity is
that they offer the possibility to calculate the shares of each sector—shares (as we
documented above) that are not directly observable in the data. In this respect,
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Table 2.4: Estimated values for the six models
Parameter HpHw HpFw CpCw CpFw HpCw FpHw
σ 4.760 4.055 4.699 4.250 4.559 4.243
α 0.386 0.222 0.358 0.232 0.375 0.372
θc w 0.747 – 0.639 – 0.640 0.838
θc p 0.743 0.578 0.684 0.455 0.715 –
θi w 0.786 – – – – 0.937
θi p 0.617 0.542 – – 0.642 –
φp 1.505 2.049 1.388 2.073 1.453 2.069
φw 0.477 0.496 0.480 0.500 0.478 0.500
φy 0.106 0.131 0.081 0.130 0.084 0.119
ρa 0.782 0.776 0.856 0.787 0.848 0.994
s
p
s p 0.846 0.211 1* 1* 0.821 –
s
p
s i 0.054 0.367 – – 0.070 –
s
p
f l 0.054 0.288 – – 0.064 1*
s
p
r o t 0.047 0.135 – – 0.045 –
s ws p 0.278 – 1* – 1* 0.190
s ws i 0.184 – – – – 0.432
s wf l 0.275 1* – 1* – 0.052
s wr o t 0.262 – – – – 0.326
λ 0.830 0.489 0.836 0.504 0.832 0.799
σa 0.033 0.013 0.029 0.012 0.027 0.005
σν 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.004
σmey 0.035 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.038




2746.39 2665.70 2745.36 2657.94 2744.97 2670.93
Note: * these parameters were not estimated but fixed. Column two of this table replicates column
two of Table 2.2. In the acronyms of the models: H-Heterogeneity, C-Calvo, F-Flexible, p-Prices
and w-Wages. Then, for example, HpFw corresponds to a model with Heterogeneity in Prices and
Flexible Wages.
The parameters are: inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ), elasticity of produc-
tion with respect to labor (1−α), rigidity in wages a la Calvo (θc w ), rigidity in prices a la Calvo (θc p ),
information rigidity in wages (θi w ), information rigidity in prices (θi p ), reaction to price inflation
(φp ), reaction to wage inflation (φw ), reaction to output gap (φy ), persistence for technology pro-
cess (ρa ), nominal interest rate smoothing (λ), share of firms with sticky prices (s
p
s p ), share of firms
with sticky information in prices (s ps i ), share of firms with flexible prices (s
p
f l ), share of firms with
rule-of-thumb prices (s pr o t ), share of households with sticky wages (s
w
s p ), share of households with
sticky information in wages (s ws i ), share of households with flexible wages (s
w
f l ), share of households
with rule-of-thumb wages (s wr o t ), standard deviation for technology process (σa ), standard devia-
tion for monetary process (σν), standard deviation for measurement error in output gap (σ
me
y ) and
standard deviation for measurement error in wage inflation (σmeπw ).
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it is not easy to make an extensive comparison against the findings in the litera-
ture due to the scarce availability of papers considering heterogeneity —with the
exception of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) estimate the population fractions of 62%, 21%, 8%, and 9% for Calvo stick-
iness, sticky information, flexible, and rule-of-thumb prices, respectively. As we
delineated, in our benchmark (HpHw) model estimation we also find that the
majority of the firms follow the Calvo price setting behavior while the share of
the firms that face some kind of stickiness in prices (basically the sum of Calvo
price setters and sticky information firms) is 90%. Both results are in line with
the findings of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), where to the end of the latter
the cumulative sum of firms which face Calvo and sticky information in Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011) is 83%. The estimated population shares in the two
papers are also similar for the case of flexible prices (5% in our study vs. 8% in
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)).
Another result to highlight is the drastic effect of the inclusion of rigidity on
the estimated shares in models with heterogeneity in prices. Specifically, com-
paring the model HpFw with models HpHw and HpCw (a model with flexible
wages versus two models with some kind of rigidity in wages) we can observe that
the inclusion of stickiness in wages, irrespective of the presence of heterogeneity
in this stickiness, substantially increases the estimated share of firms that follow
a sticky price rule. The fact that the data favors a higher share of sticky price firms
once sticky wages are included suggests that these two types of nominal rigidi-
ties reinforce each other when matching the macroeconomic data —a result that
confirms the findings in previous empirical studies such as Druant et al. (2009).
Finally, a basic model comparison regarding the ability of each model to fit
the data confirms the usual result in the literature that models which consider
only flexible prices or flexible wages are dominated by specifications where those
are assumed to be rigid (last row of Table 2.4). In the same line, the compari-
son among models reveals that the posterior model probability favors the model
which incorporates the simultaneous heterogeneity in price and wage setting be-
havior (Table 2.5). Most importantly, the benchmark model HpHw, with hetero-
geneity in price and wage setting behavior outperforms the traditional specifica-
tion with prices and wages a la Calvo (CpCw) in fitting the data.
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Table 2.5: Model comparison
Model HpHw HpFw CpCw CpFw HpCw FpHw
Priors 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166
Log Marginal Density 2746.39 2665.70 2745.36 2657.94 2744.97 2670.93
Posterior Model Probability 0.627 0 0.222 0 0.151 0
Note: In the acronyms of the models: H-Heterogeneity, C-Calvo, F-Flexible, p-Prices and w-Wages.
Then, for example, HpFw corresponds to a model with Heterogeneity in Prices and Flexible Wages.
















Note: In the acronyms of the models: H-Heterogeneity, C-Calvo, F-Flexible, p-Prices and w-Wages. Then, for
example, HpFw corresponds to a model with Heterogeneity in Prices and Flexible Wages.
2.6.2 Implications of Wage Setting Heterogeneity for Monetary and
Technology Shocks
2.6.2.1 Monetary Shocks
Figures 2.1-2.4 illustrate the responses of the four key model variables after a
positive (tightening) monetary shock using the estimated monetary policy reac-
tion function. For the output gap variable, the six models can be separated into
two broad groups based on the incorporation of nominal wage rigidities. This is
somewhat an expected result given that the estimated parameters across mod-
els within each group (nominal wage rigidity group vs. flexible wages group) are
very similar, in particular the parameters measuring the population fractions of
sectors with differing price setting behavior.
As a key contribution of our analysis, we find that the incorporation of het-
erogeneity in wage setting behavior yields impulse-responses that are different
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Note: In the acronyms of the models: H-Heterogeneity, C-Calvo, F-Flexible, p-Prices and w-Wages. Then, for
example, HpFw corresponds to a model with Heterogeneity in Prices and Flexible Wages.
from what one obtains using a more standard model where Calvo-type nominal
wage setting is uniform across households. Particularly in models where price-
setting heterogeneity is present, following a monetary contraction; the output
gap contracts less and recovers more quickly in the model with heterogeneous
wage setters compared to the model with uniform Calvo-type wage setting.24
We also obtain interesting qualitative effects of wage-setting heterogeneity on
inflation. Specifically, with respect to the nominal price changes; when hetero-
geneity in wage setting is allowed, the pricing inflation exhibits some level of per-
sistence following a monetary contraction. Such qualitative price inflation per-
sistence cannot be observed in any of the other alternative model specifications.
Similarly, following a monetary contraction, the model with wage setting hetero-
geneity generates wage inflation persistence, too. As a matter of fact, the model
produces initially declining wage inflation and then a follow-up stagnation in
wage inflation and then rising wage inflation. None of the alternative models are
capable of generating this qualitative cyclical property either. This is an impor-
tant qualitative result, because inflation persistence is a significant characteristic
of the business cycle data as have been highlighted by Rotemberg and Woodford
24None of the estimated models are able to reproduce the hump shape in the response of output
gap. This anomaly can be explained by taking into account that the models in the current paper
are very stylized and do not take into account other rigidities, particularly consumption habits.
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(1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Altig et al. (2002), Rabanal and
Rubio-Ramírez (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) (for prices)
and by Edge, Laubach and Williams (2003) (for wages). Using VAR-based ap-
proaches these papers find a substantial amount of inertia and persistence in
price and wage inflation following monetary contractions and show that to repli-
cate these dynamics, DSGE models should exhibit strong internal propagation
mechanisms. In this regard, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) conclude
that this propagation mechanism could be achieved by incorporating additional
frictions to the standard model, specifically the inclusion of habit formation, ad-
justment cost in investment and notably, variable capital utilization. We note
that our benchmark model (HpHw) replicates the inertia and persistence of both
price and wage inflation without relying on any of those propagation mecha-
nisms.
With respect to the nominal interest rate, the behavior of the set-up with het-
erogeneous wage rigidity shows qualitative similarities with the rest of the sticky-
wages class of models. To this end, there is a striking quantitative difference
though: The model with heterogeneous wage setting produces a nominal inter-
est rate, which reacts to the monetary contraction significantly less compared to
the models with standard Calvo-type nominal wage setting.
To the end of the overall nominal wage rigidity, Figure 2.3 illustrates the im-
plausibly strong reaction of the wage inflation in models with flexible wages
which is, as we delineated before, at odds with macro data. This strong reaction
is followed by an implausibly large reaction into the opposite direction starting
the second period. This effect is more persistent in the models where no hetero-
geneity in prices is considered because there is not a sector with flexible prices
that can be adjusted. The muted behavior of wage inflation in models with sticky
wages reduces the implication of the monetary shock for real wages. In this way
it helps to counteract (through the marginal cost) the effect of such shocks on in-
flation resulting from the decline in the output gap. As a result, models with rigid
wages exhibit more subtle reactions of price inflation (Figure 2.2). The lower
the reaction of the price inflation, the higher and more persistent response of
the nominal interest rate (Figure 2.4). This property brings as its consequence
sharper contractions in output gap following monetary shocks (Figure 2.1).
2.6.2.2 Technology Shocks
The responses of the key macro variables following a technology shock are pre-
sented in Figures 2.5 to 2.8. As in the case of a monetary shock, the response to a
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Note: In the acronyms of the models: H-Heterogeneity, C-Calvo, F-Flexible, p-Prices and w-Wages. Then, for
example, HpFw corresponds to a model with Heterogeneity in Prices and Flexible Wages.
technology shock is differentiated according to the presence of rigidity of nom-
inal wages. It is worth noting that the responses for all variables are more per-
sistent (compared to a monetary shock) given that for all models the estimated
value for the persistence of the technology shock (ρa ) is high. Qualitatively, the
wage inflation persistence property of the heterogeneous wage setting model
is observable following a technology shock as well. Price inflation behavior is
comparable across the class models which incorporate nominal wage rigidities.
Quantitatively, we obtain that the output gap and the nominal interest rate in the
model with heterogeneous wage setting reacts more compared to the model with
standard Calvo-type nominal wage setting.
Our results show that incorporating heterogeneity in wage rigidity–in addi-
tion to the heterogeneity in price setting–enriches the business cycle implica-
tions of a standard New-Keynesian model qualitative and quantitatively.
Figure 2.5 illustrates a strong decline in the output gap for the three models
incorporating nominal rigidities in wages and a comparatively more pronounced
decline once heterogeneity in wages is considered (HpHw). This reduction is ex-
plained by a strong rise in natural output, that is proportionally stronger in the
model with heterogeneity in wage setting behavior. This is not a direct result of
heterogeneity though, but rather a consequence of the estimated parameter val-
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ues resulting from the model specification, particularly the lower estimated value
of the inverse elasticity of substitution. Unsurprisingly, the output gap is more
persistent in models where wages present some degree of rigidity. With respect
to the price inflation (Figure 2.6), we can observe that all of the model specifi-
cations can capture the fall in price inflation following a technology shock. The
response of price inflation (to a technology shock) closely correlates with the re-
sponse of the output gap, where the response of price inflation to a technology
shock is stronger whenever there is a large decline in output gap (except for the
model with flexible prices). Figure 2.7 exhibits a larger variance in the response of
wage inflation - with respect to a technology shock - in those models with flexible
wages, which is a consequence of the pronounced positive response observed in
the first periods - followed by even a more strong decline in wages in between pe-
riods three to seven. The dynamics of the nominal interest rate (Figure 2.8) is in
line with the response of the output gap and the inflation in wages and prices. In
particular, we can show that the reaction rule of the monetary policy in models
with only flexible wages implies a strong reduction of the interest rate two pe-
riods following the technology shock in order to compensate for the large and
more persistent reductions observed in the wage inflation.
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2.6.3 Conclusions for monetary policy and wage flexibility
Our analysis builds upon the estimated DSGE model of Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2011) with strategic interaction among heterogeneous price setting
by incorporating not only nominal wage rigidities but also heterogeneity in the
wage-setting behavior. That makes our model more complete and more relevant
for analyzing the interaction between price and wage rigidities. Some authors
(e.g., Christoffel and Linzert (2010)) separate the production process in two steps
with only wage rigidities in the intermediate sector and price rigidities in the
final goods sector and thus not allowing for an interaction between price and
wage rigidities in the model - unlike our set-up.
In our model there is a real interaction between price and wage rigidities -
reinforcing the dynamics generated by each type of friction. More price rigidities
lead to more wage rigidities and vice versa. Companies have less need to adjust
their price setting if wages and their marginal costs change less frequently. Our
Impulse Response Functions (IRF) in figures 2.1-2.4 show large differences be-
tween flexible and rigid wages as already concluded in the previous section, while
the difference between Calvo wages and Heterogeneity in staggered wage adjust-
ment (respectively Cw and Hw) seems to be less obvious than the difference with
Flexible wages (Fw). This is from an intuitive point of view quite understandable.
On the basis of the IRF for the output gap after a monetary shock in Figure
2.1 and the IRF for price inflation after a monetary shock in Figure 2.2 we may
conclude that given price rigidities it matters a lot for monetary policy whether
there are wage rigidities or not. If wages are flexible, monetary policy is much
more effective than if wages are sticky. In the case of wage flexibility the costs
of monetary policy in terms of the output gap are also smaller than with wage
rigidities. We also show that the effectiveness of monetary policy is higher with
the standard-Calvo compared to the Heterogeneous wage setting model. There-
fore, it turns out that heterogeneous wage setting behavior is decisive for both
the effectiveness and costs of monetary policy. Two important papers recently
studied the importance of wage flexibility for the conduct of monetary policy and
macroeconomic performance: Galí (2013) studies a closed economy New Keyne-
sian model and shows that macroeconomic consequences of wage flexibility de-
pends on the type of the monetary policy rule choice of the Central Bank. For the
context of an open economy, Galí and Monacelli (2014) illustrate that an increase
in wage flexibility could reduce macroeconomic welfare in economies under an
exchange rate peg. We contribute to this policy debate by emphasizing that it is
not only the level of aggregate labor market flexibility but also the distribution of
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wage setting behavior across the economy what matters for the macroeconomic
policymaking.
2.7 Conclusions
Nominal rigidities in prices and wages have proven to be two useful mechanisms
that allow New Keynesian DSGE models to replicate several stylized facts ob-
served in the data. For instance, the presence of nominal rigidities increases the
persistence of some key variables after a shock and besides it allows for non-
neutrality of monetary policy in the short run. However, the way this friction
is usually incorporated in the DSGE models—staggering price and wage setting
following Calvo (1983)—is somehow arbitrary, restrictive, and in contradiction
to empirical findings regarding the timing of price and wage adjustments across
economic sectors and occupations.
In order to bypass these shortcomings, several alternatives have been consid-
ered. These include models where the rigidity in prices and wages is not time de-
pendent as in Calvo (1983) or Taylor (1999), but it is state dependent as in Caplin
and Leahy (1991) or setups where nominal rigidities are the consequence of in-
formational frictions (Mankiw and Reis, 2002). In addition, some authors have
preferred a specification where the Calvo scheme is preserved but at the same
time extended to include greater heterogeneity in price and wage setting by al-
lowing, for example, for sectoral differences in firms and types of households.
This paper can be framed within this latter strand of research. Therefore, an
otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model is considered, but it is assumed
that four types of firms (sectors) and four types of households set their prices
and wages according to four different rules. These rules are: sticky prices, sticky
information, full flexibility, and indexation to previous price or wage inflation.
The linearized model was estimated using Bayesian techniques for the United
States from 1955 to 2008, and was then compared to more restricted specifica-
tions. Subsequently, the models were utilized to investigate the business cycle
implications of wage-and-price setting heterogeneity.
Our estimation results show that most firms and households face rigidities
in prices and wages either in a time-dependent manner or as a consequence of
informational frictions. At the same time, the share of households with flexi-
bility in wages is four times greater than the corresponding share of firms with
flexible prices indicating that heterogeneity is an important feature characterize
2.8. APPENDIX 41
households’ wage-setting behavior. The estimated model can produce impulse-
responses are in line with the dynamics observed in actual data.
The impulse-responses also reveal that allowing heterogeneity in wage rigid-
ity amplify the macroeconomic fluctuations resulting from a technology shock
whereas they mitigate the macroeconomic fluctuations resulting from a mone-
tary tightening. We also identify interesting qualitative business cycle dynamics
generated by the heterogeneity in wage rigidity, such as price and wage infla-
tion persistence, which standard models with only Calvo-type wage rigidity fail
to achieve. Moreover, our results suggest that the standard approach of model-
ing prices and wages symmetrically is a very strong assumption whose effects are
not trivial. Finally, we find that the model with heterogeneity in wage and price
setting fits the data the best compared to the models where wages are allowed to
be flexible and prices are set according to heterogeneous price-setting rules as in
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011).
Incorporating heterogeneity in prices and wages in an otherwise standard
DSGE model allows for compelling qualitative and quantitative results that
deserve further attention. One natural path to follow is related to the imple-
mentation of the specification proposed in this paper, but in a medium-scale
DSGE model in which other nominal, real and financial frictions are considered.
Considering these additional frictions would help to isolate the implications of
heterogeneity in prices and wages and facilitate the performance of data fitting
across models. Another more substantial extension would be to make the het-
erogeneity in the price and wage setting behavior endogenous by, for example,
linking it to financial constraints faced by firms and households. These exten-
sions we leave to future research.
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2.8.2 Convergence test for the simulated chain
In order to evaluate if the samples of the chain are truly representatives of the
underlying stationary distribution of the Markov Chain, the procedure suggested
by Geweke (1999) was implemented. This method compares the mean of two
non overlapped portions of the chain, in particular, it compares draws between
5000 and 9000 to draws between 150000 and 250000. The results of a test for
equality of means is presented in Table 2.6. It is important to note the differences
in the p-value with different tapering values, this indicates the presence of auto-
correlation in the draw, and therefore, as a more reliable p-value is this case is the
one with 15% taper.
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σ 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999
α 0.000 0.730 0.724 0.703
θc w 0.940 0.993 0.993 0.993
θc p 0.000 0.464 0.459 0.411
θi w 0.000 0.421 0.380 0.288
θi p 0.000 0.404 0.382 0.372
φp 0.000 0.639 0.616 0.631
φw 0.134 0.856 0.855 0.862
φy 0.000 0.078 0.066 0.061
ρa 0.000 0.517 0.488 0.435
ŝ
p
s p 0.000 0.408 0.349 0.272
ŝ
p
s i 0.000 0.146 0.143 0.157
ŝ
p
f l 0.002 0.725 0.727 0.705
ŝ ws p 0.000 0.575 0.549 0.503
ŝ ws i 0.000 0.165 0.130 0.078
ŝ wf l 0.000 0.316 0.374 0.392
λ 0.000 0.158 0.120 0.088
σa 0.000 0.343 0.307 0.257
σν 0.165 0.884 0.868 0.851
σmey 0.718 0.971 0.971 0.970
σmeπw 0.000 0.141 0.132 0.157
Note: The parameters are: inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ), share of capital in pro-
duction (α), rigidity in wages a la Calvo (θc w ), rigidity in prices a la Calvo (θc p ), information rigidity in wages
(θi w ), information rigidity in prices (θi p ), reaction to price inflation (φp ), reaction to wage inflation (φw ), re-
action to output gap (φy ), persistence for technology process (ρa ), nominal interest rate smoothing (λ), share
of firms with sticky prices (s
p
s p ), share of firms with sticky information in prices (s
p
s i ), share of firms with flexible
prices (s
p
f l ), share of firms with rule-of-thumb prices (s
p
r o t ), share of households with sticky wages (s
w
s p ), share
of households with sticky information in wages (s ws i ), share of households with flexible wages (s
w
f l ), share of
households with rule-of-thumb wages (s wr o t ), standard deviation for technology process (σa ), standard devia-
tion for monetary process (σν), standard deviation for measurement error in output gap (σ
me
y ) and standard
deviation for measurement error in wage inflation (σmeπw ).
44 CHAPTER 2. HETEROGENEITY IN WAGE SETTING BEHAVIOR
2.8.3 Data
The data used in the estimation is from the United States for the period of 1955-
2008 in quarterly periodicity. All data observations are from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis database. In this paper four variables were used:
• Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (GDPC1).
• Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, Index 2009=100, Quar-
terly, Seasonally Adjusted (GDPDEF).
• Nonfarm Business - Hourly compensation - Index, base year = 100 - 2009
(PRS85006103).
• Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted
(FEDFUNDS).
Chapter 3
Stability and Welfare Effects of




The urgency to find and understand instruments that could help moderate the
damaging effects of economic crises on employment, consumption and output
increased after the Great Recession. One instrument that policymakers usually
bring to the table when considering those potential shock absorbers is a flexible
labor market. The underlying assumption is that greater freedom to negotiate
labor contracts at the level of firms, less stringent minimum wage laws and, im-
portantly, greater flexibility in wages, are key features that help protect, at least
to some extent, the economy from episodes of crisis.1
The neoclassical view of the relationship between wages and labor supports
the notion that greater wage flexibility has a direct impact on employment. As
Galí (2013) shows, in economies without nominal or real frictions -contrary to
microeconomic evidence- competitive firms, taking wages as given, determine
employment by demanding work to the point where the market wage is equal
1Take, for example, the reforms recommended by the European Central Bank to the countries
under the financial assistance programmes at the end of 2012 (ECB (2012), page 62).
45
46 CHAPTER 3. WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
to the marginal productivity of labor. In this scenario, wages determine employ-
ment and, therefore, a decrease in wages (under the standard assumption of de-
creasing marginal productivity) generates an increase in labor demand.
However, in modern economies, where there are several nominal and real
frictions and firms interact in monopolistically competitive markets, the link be-
tween wages and employment (and, therefore, consumption and output) is more
subtle. In such New-Keynesian economies, the effects of wage changes on em-
ployment are indirect. In particular, how monetary policy and, therefore, aggre-
gate demand respond to changes in wages, mediates these effects. As discussed
by Galí (2013), the lack of a direct impact of wages on labor demand results from
the assumptions underlying the Keynesian theory of employment. In (New) Key-
nesian economies, the demand for labor by firms depends on the level of pro-
duction that firms want to achieve, which in turn depends on aggregate demand.
Therefore, in contrast to the classical approach, where wages determine employ-
ment (and output), in New Keynesian models the causality between wages and
employment is reversed.2 An example can help us understand the relationship
between wages and employment. Suppose, for instance, that we observe a de-
crease in wages. Lower wages translate into a reduction in inflation to which
the monetary authority responds by adjusting the interest rate downward (ex-
pansionary policy). This reaction generates a positive impulse to aggregate de-
mand that, only then, stimulates firms to increase their labor demand. Note that
according to the causality in the example, it is the expansive policy stance that
generates the increase in aggregate demand and subsequently in employment.
It follows that if the ZLB restricts the interest rate, as I consider in this paper,
we would expect to see a more subtle effect of wages on employment. However,
as Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015) and Basu and Bundick (2015) have shown,
in response to various shocks, a restricted nominal interest rate would instead
increase the volatility of the aggregate variables given that reaching the lower
bound hinders the capacity of the interest rate to offset shock endogenously. This
example helps also illustrate the ambiguous effect of wage flexibility on welfare
in New-Keynesian. On the one hand, greater wage flexibility increases employ-
ment stability, improving welfare, but, on the other hand, increases inflation of
prices and wages, which are costly in terms of welfare.
Considering households with financial constraints poses an additional com-
plication for understanding the implications of greater wage flexibility in New-
2As mentioned by Galí (2013), “Under this perspective, a cut in nominal wages which is not
accompanied by an expansion in aggregate demand will leave output, employment, and the real
wage unchanged, and will have no impact on unemployment.”
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Keynesian economies. As we know, traditional households, with full access to
financial markets, smooth their consumption intertemporally, thus limiting the
effects of changes in their current income on their current consumption. There-
fore, these households behave as indicated by the permanent income hypothesis.
This is not the case for households with financial restrictions. These hand-
to-mouth households, due to their lack of financial inclusion (besides the lack
of capital and ownership of the firms) have difficulties in smoothing their con-
sumption.3 Given that labor income represents the only income of hand-to-hand
households, economic shocks affect their consumption path to a greater extent.
This would suggest that for hand-to-mouth households, having a more stable la-
bor income, resulting from a more stable wage due to a high degree of wage rigid-
ity, would represent an improvement in their welfare, as it would help them reach
a smoother consumption path. This generates a new channel through which
wage flexibility affects macroeconomic stability and welfare.4
We can only achieve an adequate understanding of the effect of greater wage
flexibility on macroeconomic stability and welfare when both the ambiguity gen-
erated by nominal rigidities and the impact of financial constraints on house-
holds are taken into account. In this paper, I consider an economy that includes
these two channels. Specifically, I investigate the macroeconomic effects of in-
creased wage flexibility by means of a medium-scale New Keynesian model à la
Smets and Wouters (2007) that incorporates the now standard specifications on
nominal rigidities in prices and wages, monopolistic competition, habit forma-
tion, investment with adjustment cost and variable capital utilization accumula-
tion in a closed economy framework and where, additionally, a fraction of house-
holds do not have access to financial markets.
3Throughout this paper, we refer to financially constrained households as hand-to-mouth
households. Literature sometimes refers to them as non-Ricardians or rule-of-thumb households.
4Several papers have found empirical support for the presence of financially constrained house-
holds. In a seminal paper Campbell and Mankiw (1989) found that for the United States in the
pre-1990 period, the fraction of hand-to-mouth households were 50%. Recent papers have found
that for the case of the United States, the weight of hand-to-mouth consumers is between 15%
and 35% e.g. López-salido and Rabanal (2006), Bartolomeo, Rossi and Tancioni (2011) and Bilbiie
and Straub (2013). The estimated weights for Europe are between 34% and 51%, e.g. Coenen and
Straub (2005), Colciago et al. (2008) and Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2009). The mentioned es-
timates are for pre-2008 financial crisis periods. It is reasonable to assume that during and after
the crisis the fraction of households without access to financial markets increases. Marto (2014)
found, for example, that for the Portuguese economy in the period 1995Q1-2012Q1 the fraction
of hand-to-mouth households were 58%. However, new evidence suggests that this could not be
the case. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018), for example, report an increase in the share of adults with
access to a financial institution between 2014 and 2017: from 62% to 69% globally, and from 54%
to 63% in developing countries.
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In this paper, to model financial frictions, I move away from the represen-
tative agent assumption and consider two types of households: on the one
hand, traditional Ricardian households with access to financial markets who can
smooth their consumption intertemporally. On the other hand, hand-to-mouth
households that do not have access to financial markets, do not own capital
or own firms and whose consumption, consequently, depends solely on their
current labor income. Using this calibrated model, I investigate the short-term
effects on economic activity of greater wage flexibility by analyzing the response
of key macroeconomic variables to nominal and real shocks. Also, this paper
examines the welfare implications of the interaction between wage flexibility
and households with financial constraints using a second-order approximation
of the utility and policy functions. Given the above-mentioned relevance of the
nominal interest rate, in the analysis I consider scenarios in which the zero lower
bound is active and when it is not.
This analysis delivers two main findings. First, the responses of several key
macroeconomic variables reveal that the traditional notion regarding the stabil-
ity benefits of greater wage flexibility does not hold when even a small fraction of
households do not have access to financial markets. The inability of these house-
holds to smooth their consumption intertemporally generates stronger and more
persistent responses of, e.g., the real wage, output gap, and consumption. When
the zero lower bound restricts the nominal interest rate, the volatility of these
variables increases further, which highlights how important the monetary policy
response is in a scenario of incomplete asset market participation.
Second, regarding welfare effects, I found that greater wage flexibility is,
in general, detrimental to welfare when some households have financial con-
straints. There are small improvements in welfare associated with greater wage
flexibility, but only when starting from a high (not plausible) initial rigidity, e.g.,
with salaries that only change every 20 quarters on average. Along the same
lines, the analysis of the interaction between wage and price flexibility shows
that greater wage flexibility only improves welfare when prices are also very
flexible. Otherwise, when I assume that prices are relatively rigid and change
on average each year, as empirical evidence suggests, greater wage flexibility is
detrimental to welfare. I found, moreover, that with full participation in financial
markets, the monetary authority can contribute to improving welfare by control-
ling the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on inflation, while maintaining
its beneficial effects on labor stability. However, when a fraction of households
have financial constraints, this ability of the monetary authority disappears and
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greater wage flexibility decreases welfare regardless of how strong the response
of the interest rate to inflation is.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. On the one hand, to a
vast literature that addresses the implications of considering households with
financial constraints or with limited participation in the asset market. Papers
like Mankiw (2000), Amato and Laubach (2003b), Galí, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2004), Galí, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007), Bilbiie
(2008), Leith and von Thadden (2008), Furlanetto (2011), Bi and Kumhof (2011),
Colciago (2011), Furlanetto and Seneca (2012), Motta and Tirelli (2012), Natvik
(2012), Ascari, Colciago and Rossi (2016) and Nisticò (2016), investigate the theo-
retical effects of the presence of financially constrained households for monetary
and fiscal policy, and for the short-term response of macroeconomic variables to
exogenous shocks.
On the other hand, this paper contributes to the literature that deals with the
effects of wage flexibility on stability and welfare. In this sense, Galí (2013) found
that the monetary policy rule followed by the central bank is decisive to conclude
whether greater wage flexibility improves welfare. The author found that welfare
can decrease with more flexible wages if the central bank follows a Taylor-type
rule that responds weakly to price inflation. Along the same lines, Bils and Chang
(2003) examine the impact of wage rigidity on welfare when employment has an
effort and an hours dimension. The authors found that in the face of monetary
shocks, the welfare cost of wage rigidity is small because the labor market clears
through the effort margin, that is, after a shock, consumption (and aggregate de-
mand) does not change significantly because agents adjust their level of effort.
In the framework of open-economy models, specifically an economy within
a monetary union, Galí and Monacelli (2016) question the common opinion that
an increase in wage flexibility is particularly desirable in a currency union. In
this respect, the authors found that for a country within a currency union, the
impact of labor cost on employment stability is lower than for a country with au-
tonomous monetary policy and a price stability objective. The authors conclude
that greater wage flexibility could be welfare reducing for an economy within a
currency union, but it could increase welfare if a simultaneous increase in price
flexibility accompanies the rise in wage flexibility.
Calmfors and Johansson (2006) reached similar results. The authors found
that more flexible nominal wages increase employment stability but increase
price variability, decreasing welfare. The authors conclude that more flexible
wages within a monetary union are an imperfect substitute for an autonomous
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monetary policy because their effects only partially compensate for the increased
variability of employment associated with union membership. Using a general
equilibrium model of two countries, Spange (2008) shows that the flexibility of
real wages increases the stability of consumption in both countries, increasing
welfare. However, the impact of the consumption level on welfare depends on
the parameters of the model. Therefore, the combined effect of consumption
volatility and the consumption level on welfare is ambiguous. The author found
that it could be the case that an equilibrium exists with flexible real wages in
one country and rigid in the other, offering the possibility of welfare improving
coordinated policy.
In a paper related to the present one, Ascari, Colciago and Rossi (2016) con-
sider the interaction between financially restricted households and sticky wages
finding that once they consider wage rigidity, limited asset market participation
does not substantially affect welfare or the monetary policy design. The authors
found that there is an effect only when they fix the fraction of households with fi-
nancial restrictions on empirically implausible values. Compared with Ascari,
Colciago and Rossi (2016) the present paper considers a medium-sized DSGE
model that includes characteristics and shocks that have proven to be indispens-
able for the correct understanding of business cycles and to reproduce essential
aspects of modern economies. Especially relevant for the analysis when some
agents have financial restrictions, the present paper includes capital accumula-
tion and utilization as control variables of households. Also, this paper focuses on
the study of the response to economic perturbation when the zero lower bound
is potentially binding.
More recently, in a model with workers (without access to financial markets)
and capitalists (who own the production technology but do not work), Walsh
(2017) found that welfare improves with greater wage flexibility under the opti-
mal monetary policy. However, reaching the lower bound of the effective interest
rate reverses this result. In relation to Walsh (2017), who considers a fixed level
of capital, the present paper includes investment, which is costly to adjust, and
the level of capital utilization as control variables of households. In addition, I
carried out the welfare analysis using a second-order approximation around the
inefficient steady state, which is arguably not only more accurate but also more
realistic.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. Section 3.2 describes
the model economy. Section 3.3 analyses the response of dynamic responses of
several macroeconomic variables to productivity, demand, labor and investment
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shocks while in Section 3.4 I discuss the welfare effects of greater wage flexibility
in a framework of limited asset market participation. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The model
Departing from the traditional way in which households are modeled on New-
Keynesian models, households in this economy are heterogeneous regarding
their access to financial markets. In particular, only a fraction of households
have access to financial assets, which allows them to smooth their consumption
intertemporally. The rest of households face liquidity constraints that force them
to consume only their current labor income in each period.
The model considers all the characteristics, which have proved fundamen-
tal for fitting the data, of a full-fledged New Keynesian DSGE model in the spirit
of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007) including habit in
consumption, nominal and real frictions. Households and firms have monop-
olistic power over their labor and their products, respectively, allowing them to
set wages and prices but only after receiving an exogenous random signal à la
Calvo (1983).5 Consequently, the model includes nominal rigidities since only a
fraction of firms and households can set prices or wages in each period. House-
holds owning capital choose its level of utilization and there is a cost associated
with investment adjustments. The government is in charge of fiscal policy. Mon-
etary policy follows a Taylor rule that takes into account inflation, the output
gap, and its dynamic. The model considers a closed economy subject to eight
shocks: preferences, productivity, labor supply, price and wage markup, govern-
ment spending, investment and interest rate.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] divided into two types.
Both types share the same utility function and face the same shocks, but they are
different in terms of their ability to smooth consumption. A fraction (1−ϑ) of
households are of the standard Ricardian (or optimizer) type, common to New-
Keynesian models. These households have access to financial instruments (gov-
ernment bonds), receive the profits of the firms, own the capital, which they rent
to the firms after choosing its level of utilization and invest. In contrast, a fraction
ϑ of households have financial restrictions. These hand-to-mouth households
5In the model the firms can hire and fire workers only restricted by the demand of their products.
No employment protection regulations are considered.
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do not have access to financial markets, do not possess capital, do not invest and
do not own firms. Therefore, their only source of income comes from their labor
(and perhaps some transfers).
3.2.1.1 Ricardian households
















and capital utilization (zt ) in order to maximize its utility func-
tion given by:



















, i ∈ (1−ϑ, 1].
(3.1)
The parameter h measures habit formation, σc is the inverse of the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution, ω parametrizes the disutility of labor, σl
is the Frisch elasticity and β is the discount factor. The preference and labor

















+ηLt , respectively. The maximization problem for the Ri-
cardian household is restricted by its budget constraint and the evolution of
capital:
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Rt represents the gross nominal interest rate, W
o
t (i ) is the real wage, rt is the
return on capital, rs s is the steady state return on capital,πt is the aggregate price
inflation, D i v ot (i ) are the dividends and Tt are transfers from the government.









ηIt . The depreciation rate is given by τwhileψ and ϕ are scale parameters.









































































rt = rs s e
ψ(zt−1),
where qt is Tobin’s q andλ
o
t is the marginal utility of consumption for Ricardians.
3.2.1.2 Hand-to-mouth households
Hand-to-mouth households have the same utility function as optimizers and




that maximizes it. Here, however, the bud-
get constraint is simpler and only contains labor income and transfers, that is
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(3.2)














where λnrt is the marginal utility of consumption for hand-to-mouth households.
3.2.2 Labor supply and wage setting
As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) and Colciago (2011), I suppose that firms
hire from a continuum of labor markets indexed by s ∈ [0, 1] each one represented
by a different union. Each household i supplies all types of labor and, given the
wage set by the union (W st ), will supply the amount of labor demanded by firms
(L st ) according to








The parameter λw is the markup in the labor market and L
d
t , Wt are the ag-
gregate labor demand and aggregate wages, respectively (these will be explained
later). The demand for labor type s is split uniformly across the households so
that households supply an identical amount of labor services (L ot (i ) = L
nr
t (i ) =
L t ). The total number of hours allocated to the different labor markets/unions
must satisfy the resource constraint L t =
∫ 1
0
L st d s . Combining this constraint
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with (3.3) yields










It follows that the labor income for Ricardians and hand-to-mouth house-
holds is the same and is given by W ot (i )L
o













− 1+λwλw d s .
Since households have differentiated labor, they enjoy monopolistic power
and can set their wage, which they can change subject to receiving a random
wage–change signal(Calvo, 1983). The probability of receiving this signal (and,
therefore, the fraction of households that can change their wage) is given by
(1−θw ). The rest of the households θw can not establish their wages optimally







where γw represents the degree of wage indexation.
The union problem is therefore to choose a wage that maximizes the dis-
counted weighted average difference between the utility of consumption ob-
tained from labor income and the disutility associated with the loss of leisure of
both types of households taking into account the probability of changing wages


























































λht (i ), h ∈ {o , n r } represents the marginal utility of consumption for Ricar-
dians and hand-to-mouth households, respectively. The solution to this problem
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with ηwt representing a wage markup shock.
3.2.3 Firms
3.2.3.1 Final good sector
Firms in this sector produce a final good, which they sell to households and the
government, combining a continuum of differentiated goods denoted by j ∈ [0, 1]










whereλp is the markup in the goods market. The demand for intermediate goods
and the price of the final good are given, respectively by
Yt ( j ) =

Pt ( j )
Pt
− 1+λpλp









Intermediate firm j has monopolistic power, produces according to a Cobb-
Douglas technology using capital and a bundle of the labor provided by the
households. The production function is given by
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Cost minimization of production and labor cost by firm j yields the following
demand for capital, labor and its varieties:
rt =αε
a
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3.2.4 Price setting
Intermediate firms set prices to maximize profits. As with wages, prices are not




, of intermediate firms can change prices
in every period. Firms that do not receive the random price-change signal index
their prices to price inflation by Pt ( j ) = π
γp
t−1Pt−1( j ). The problem of the firm is
to choose its price taking into consideration the exogenous price rigidity and the
demand for its product (given by (3.4)) as follows:
max






















where γp is the price indexation parameter and m ct is the marginal cost, to be








































with ηpt representing a price markup shock.
3.2.5 Government
The government expenditure is assumed to wander randomly around its steady








+ηGt . Government income
is represented by taxes collected from both types of households and bonds issued









Monetary policy is set according to a generalized Taylor rule. Specifically, the
central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, in a smoothed way, in response to
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+ηrt is the monetary shock,ρR determines interest rate
smoothing and Y
p
t is the natural or potential output, i.e. the output reached in
the economy without nominal frictions and in which all households have access
to financial markets.
3.2.7 Aggregation
Aggregate values for consumption, bonds, capital, dividends and investment are
given, respectively by
Bt = (1−ϑ)B ot , Kt = (1−ϑ)K
o
t ,
D i vt = (1−ϑ)D i v ot , It = (1−ϑ) I
o
t ,
Ct = ϑC nrt + (1−ϑ)C
o
t .
3.2.8 Parameterization and solution strategy
Most of the parameters mirror those estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003) (ta-
bles 3.1 and 3.2). The only exceptions are the parameters representing the re-
sponse of the interest rate to inflation and output gap. These parameters follow
Smets and Wouters (2007) where the authors assume zero inflation at the steady
state.
The model is solved using a second-order approximation, which as men-
tioned more detailed in Section 3.4, yields a more accurate approximation of
the welfare functions. Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011) provided the numerical
solution to the model while the toolkit of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) helped
with the construction of the impulse-response functions that take into account
the zero lower bound.
3.3 Dynamic responses
This section presents the dynamic effects of the interaction between wage rigidity
and financially constrained households, with and without a binding zero lower
bound (ZLB). Figures 3.1 to 3.11 show the response of several key macroeconomic
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Table 3.1: Parameters for the structural equations
Parameter Value Description
α 0.30 share of capital
β 0.99 discount factor
Gs s 0.36 steady state government expenses
γp 0.47 price indexation
γw 0.76 wage indexation
h 0.57 habit formation
λp 0.37 goods markup
λw 0.5 labor markup
ω 1 disutility of labor
Φ 0.82 fixed cost
ψ 0.17 scale parameters
ψ1 2 response to inflation
ψ2 0.08 response to output gap
σc 1.35 1/EIS
σl 2.4 Frisch elasticity
τ 0.025 depreciation
υ 0 fraction of hand-to-mouth households
ϕ 6.77 scale parameters
θp 0.91 price rigidity
θw 0.74 wage rigidity
Table 3.2: Parameters for the shocks
Parameter Value Description
ρa 0.82 autoregression coefficient for the technology shock
ρb 0.86 autoregression coefficient for the preference shock
ρG 0.95 autoregression coefficient for the government shock
ρr 0.6 autoregression coefficient for the monetary shock
ρI 0.93 autoregression coefficient for the investment shock
ρL 0.89 autoregression coefficient for the labor shock
ρR 0.81 interest rate smoother
σa 0.120 standard deviation of the technology shock
σb 0.067 standard deviation of the preference shock
σG 0.065 standard deviation of the government shock
σI 0.017 standard deviation of the investment shock
σL 0.704 standard deviation of the labor shock
σr 0.016 standard deviation of the monetary shock
σηp 0.032 standard deviation of the price markup shock
σηw 0.058 standard deviation of the wage markup shock
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variables after productivity, labor, investment, monetary and demand shocks.6
Each figure depicts four scenarios combining high and low wage rigidity with
different degrees of asset market participation. Specifically, solid lines represent
a high level of wage flexibility (θw = 0.3) while dashed lines depict a low level of
wage flexibility (θw = 0.75).7 In addition, circle-marked lines represent the case of
full market participation (υ= 0) while unmarked lines amount to the case when
70% of households are financially constrained (υ= 0.7).8
3.3.1 Positive Productivity Shock
Inflation responds negatively in all four scenarios to a positive productivity shock
(figures 3.1 to 3.3). The responses are almost identical when the ZLB is not bind-
ing, except in the case of high wage flexibility and a high fraction of financially
constrained households. In that case, we observe a greater fall and a faster recov-
ery. However, when the ZLB is binding, a high level of wage flexibility amplifies
the fall in inflation, marginally in an economy with full participation in the asset
market, but considerably when a significant fraction of households do not have
access to the financial system.
The behavior of inflation determines to a large extent the response of the in-
terest rate. After a positive productivity shock, the nominal interest rate hits the
ZLB almost immediately, reaching it sooner with high wage flexibility and even
more so when this flexibility is combined with a high fraction of hand-to-mouth
households. Once in the ZLB, the interest rate stays in it for a longer time when
there is full participation in the asset market and low wage flexibility. Compar-
atively, the nominal interest rate returns to be positive, two periods in advance,
when the fraction of hand-to-mouth households is high, regardless of the level of
wage flexibility. This behavior changes when the interest rate never reaches the
ZLB. In this scenario, more wage flexibility calls for a stronger response from the
interest rate (stronger in the presence of financial constraints) and, as seen in the
6The response to a monetary shock is not presented here because its behavior is similar to the
one observed in the case of a productivity shock. The impulse-response for a monetary shock and
a government can be found in Appendix 3.6.
7A level of wage rigidity of θw = 0.75, translates to a duration of wage spells of four quarters on
average.
8I used 70% as the share of hand-to-mouth households to highlight more clearly the implica-
tions of financial constraints. This value is near to the estimates in the literature. The value I chose
is also intended to cover those households that have access to financial markets but do not use
their financial services. In other words, to try to include those households that, despite having
a bank account, do not use it to save. The fraction of these households is more difficult to mea-
sure, but some anecdotal evidence suggests that, at least in developing countries, the proportion
of households in this category is not negligible.
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Figure 3.1: Response to a positive productivity shock - I
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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figure, in general, the interest rate is more stable when there is a large fraction of
hand-to-mouth consumers and wage is relatively rigid.
Consumption is one of the aggregates that shows the greatest change in its
dynamic response once the model incorporates households with differentiated
access to the financial market. In a scenario with full asset market participation,
aggregate consumption responds positively to a positive productivity shock. The
hump-shaped response is common in the literature and, as seen in Figure 3.2, is
essentially independent of the level of wage rigidity. The response of aggregate
consumption is reversed, however, when a fraction of households have finan-
cial constraints. When this is the case, aggregate consumption decreases drasti-
cally and it is clear that an increase in wage flexibility substantially increases the
volatility of this aggregate. Figure 3.2 shows that the effect of the interest rate on
aggregate consumption is relatively minor except in the case of high wage flex-
ibility and a high degree of financial restrictions. In this case, the unrestricted
nominal interest rate helps mitigate the drop in aggregate consumption.
The behavior of hand-to-mouth households explains the sharp contrast in
the response of aggregate consumption between the scenarios of full and limited
participation in the financial market. As seen in the figure, the consumption of
non-financially constrained households (optimizers) increases in all cases after
a productivity shock. The figure also highlights that greater wage flexibility de-
creases optimizer consumption variability, as intuition suggests, but increases it
to a large extent in the case of hand-to-mouth households. When the ZLB is not
binding, the nominal interest rate helps to significantly reduce the differences in
the optimizers’ consumption responses for the different degrees of wage flexibil-
ity, given the fraction of financially constrained households. This finding attests
to the importance of considering the ZLB when departing from the assumption
of total participation in the financial market.
The behavior of the real wage explains in part the response of aggregate con-
sumption. In an economy with high wage rigidity (and also price rigidity), real
wages essentially do not respond to shocks in productivity, regardless of the frac-
tion of hand-to-mouth households. However, when a fraction of households
does not have access to financial markets, greater wage flexibility amplifies the
decrease in real wages. Similar to the case of consumption, a non-active ZLB
helps to mitigate the negative response of the real wage.
Although this paper does not consider this aspect, the real wage response
highlights the far-reaching distributional implications of wage flexibility when
the assumption that the income of a fraction of households corresponds solely
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Figure 3.2: Response to a positive productivity shock - II
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound

























 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7























Aggregate Consumption (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7























Consumption of hand-to-mouth households (ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7























Consumption of hand-to-mouth households (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7
























Consumption of optimizers (ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7
























Consumption of optimizers (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7
3.3. DYNAMIC RESPONSES 63
Figure 3.3: Response to a positive productivity shock - III
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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to their labor income replaces the assumption of full participation in the financial
market.
There are no notable differences in the response of labor to a productivity
shock despite different assumptions about wage flexibility, access to financial
markets or the behavior of the nominal interest rate. The decrease observed in
labor, however, contributes to the generation of a negative output gap (both out-
put and potential output increase, but the last one does so to a greater extent).
The response of the output gap highlights again the implications of reaching the
ZLB. When the lower limit is not binding, the reaction of the output gap is similar
in economies with different degrees of wage flexibility given the fraction of hand-
to-mouth households considered. When the ZLB is active, this is no longer the
case and the output gap shows a stronger negative response for economies with
financially constrained households and a higher level of wage flexibility.
3.3.2 Negative Demand Shock
The dynamic responses of most of the variables to a negative demand shock are
similar to those observed after a positive productivity shock. However, there are
notable differences as shown in figures 3.4 to 3.6. Although I calibrated the shock
so that the ZLB becomes binding during the same number of periods as in the
case of the productivity shock, the figures show that, in contrast with the effect of
the latter, after a negative demand shock, the interest rate reaches the lower limit
only when wage flexibility is high. In this case, the interest rate reaches the lower
limit more quickly when households with financial restrictions are considered,
exhibiting, in turn, a speedier recovery. We also observe a faster recovery when
nominal wage flexibility is low and we assume the presence of a large fraction of
hand-to-mouth households.
After a negative demand shock, under a particular combination of parame-
ters, mainly the assumption about the degree of rigidity of the nominal wage, it
seems that the model is capable of reproducing the behavior of real wages ob-
served in three of the last four recessions. As we can see in Figure 3.4, in re-
cessions generated by a demand shock, and importantly, when assuming that
nominal wages are very rigid, real wages only shows a slight reduction with re-
spect to their steady state. On the contrary, if we suppose that nominal wages
are more flexible, these results disappear and we observe a significant decrease
in real wages.
The responses of the main variables, such as in the case of a productivity
shock, are mostly the same when wages are highly rigid and all households have
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Figure 3.4: Response to a negative demand shock - I
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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full access to financial markets. However, Figure 3.4 shows that once the finan-
cial restrictions are in force, the increase in wage flexibility generates a decrease
in real wages twice as large compared to the scenario of full participation in the
asset market. This discrepancy intensifies when the ZLB restricts the nominal
interest rate.
The responses of output and output are similar to those of the real wage. Both
measures of production decrease considerably, and the amplifying effect of the
interaction between more wage flexibility and the presence of hand-to-mouth
households when the ZLB is binding is clear. Interestingly, having a fraction of
hand-to-mouth households, when wages are more rigid, makes the output gap
less sensitive to a demand shock. When the ZLB is not binding, differences in
the response of the output gap between the four scenarios almost disappear and
it becomes evident that having a fraction of households financially constrained
helps stabilize the economy regardless of the degree of wage flexibility.
Consumption of both optimizers and hand-to-mouth households decreases
in response to a negative demand shock and, as expected, greater wage flexibility
significantly increases the volatility of the response of the latter group. It is note-
worthy that when the ZLB is active, the response of aggregate consumption does
not depend on the degree of wage flexibility provided that all households have
access to financial markets.
The response of inflation when the ZLB is not active is almost indistinguish-
able for the two degrees of wage flexibility considered, given the level of partic-
ipation in the financial market. However, this is not the case when the interest
rate hits the ZLB, in which case the greater wage flexibility increases the magni-
tude of the negative response, but it does so to a greater extent in the presence of
financial constraints.
3.3.3 Positive labor and investment shocks
After a positive labor shock, the labor response is similar across the four sce-
narios, although slightly more volatile when the interest rate is not restricted by
the lower bound (figures 3.7 to 3.9). As with the shocks mentioned above, the
responses of inflation and output gap are exacerbated when the counterweight
provided by the interest rate is off the table. With respect to the response of most
of the rest of the variables, a common occurrence is the similar behavior observed
after the shock when wage flexibility is low regardless of the assumption about
the percentage of households without access to the financial market.
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Figure 3.5: Response to a negative demand shock - II
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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Figure 3.6: Response to a negative demand shock - III
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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Figure 3.7: Response to a positive labor shock - I
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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The response of aggregate consumption is worthy of mention. Total con-
sumption increases, following a similar dynamic in three of the four scenarios,
but shows a considerable decrease in the economy with high wage flexibility and
a high percentage of financially restricted households. The fall in consumption
is explained to a large extent by the negative response of the consumption of
hand-to-mouth households, motivated in turn, by the significant decrease in real
wages. In this case, low wage flexibility seems more convenient since, as the fig-
ure shows, in the presence of households whose total income corresponds only
to labor income, high wage rigidity cushions the decrease in real wages and con-
tributes to an increase in the consumption of hand-to-mouth households.
A positive investment shock, as shown in figures 3.10 and 3.11, highlights
the differences in the responses of the two types of households in an economy
with financially restricted households.9 In particular, after an increase in invest-
ment due to a decrease in the cost of installing capital, optimizing households
increase investment at the expense of their consumption. This behavior is more
pronounced when wages are more rigid and a fraction of households do not have
access to financial markets. Households without access to the financial market
do not face this dilemma and, on the contrary, their consumption increases due
to the rise in labor and real wages. As a result, hand-to-mouth households help
stabilize aggregate consumption regardless of the degree of wage flexibility.
3.3.4 Summary of the dynamic responses
We can draw several conclusions from the impulse-response functions analyzed.
In general, the results of the dynamic responses suggest that the prevailing no-
tion in some policy circles of the stabilizing benefits of greater wage flexibility
does not apply when a fraction of households have financial constraints. This is
particularly clear for variables such as the real wage, the output gap, consump-
tion and inflation, which showed stronger and more persistent responses after
the occurrence of shocks in a scenario of incomplete participation in the asset
market. The results also illustrate the critical role of the nominal interest rate
since, in most cases, monetary policy can substantially reduce the volatility of
the aforementioned variables, provided that the lower bound of the interest rate
is not binding.
9These figures only show the answers when the ZLB is not binding. A positive investment shock
generates a positive response in the nominal interest rate and, therefore, makes it impossible for
it to reach the lower limit.
3.3. DYNAMIC RESPONSES 71
Figure 3.8: Response to a positive labor shock - II
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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Figure 3.9: Response to a positive labor shock - III
Binding zero lower bound Not binding zero lower bound
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Figure 3.10: Response to a positive investment shock - I
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Figure 3.11: Response to a positive investment shock - II
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A complete view of the consequences of the interaction of wage rigidity and
financial constraints requires the analysis of their combined effects on welfare.
This is the subject in the next section.
3.4 Welfare
An analytical expression for the welfare/loss function is not available for the
model in this paper. However, given that the model is solved using a second-
order approximation, it is possible to perform a formal numerical analysis of
welfare that takes into account the effects of the second moments of the shocks
on the mean of the variables of interest. The present analysis departs, therefore,
from the traditional approach where a quadratic loss function is derived from the
second-order approximation of the welfare function and then evaluated using a
first-order approximation of the policy functions (or decision rules). As Kim and
Kim (2003) show, this approach could yield incorrect results because it ignores
some important second-order and higher-order terms of the welfare function.
Sometimes, the consequences of overlooking this term in the welfare calculation
are of such magnitude that paradoxical results appear, e.g., greater welfare in
economies with incomplete markets compared with economies with complete
markets (Kim, 1997).
As discussed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), a correct second-order ap-
proximation of the welfare function requires a second-order approximation of
the policy functions and, additionally, as a byproduct, allows the welfare assess-
ment around the (supposedly) more realistic inefficient stable state.10
In this order of ideas, I measure welfare as the weighted average of the utility
of Ricardian and hand-to-mouth households,
Wt = E






with U ot and U
nr
t given by (3.1) and (3.2), respectively.
As I mentioned, there is no analytical expression for the welfare loss function
for the model in this paper. However, it is possible, by analogy, to infer that this
function depends on key parameters associated with the frictions in the model
and with the variance of price and wage inflation, the output gap, and the gap be-
10Traditionally, welfare analysis is carried out around the efficient steady state in which the gov-
ernment, using subsidies, eliminates distortions in the markets of goods and labor created by the
monopolistic power of households and firms.
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tween the consumption of optimizing and hand-to-mouth households.11 Taking
this into account, I define the loss function as the loss of welfare with respect to
the welfare in the steady state,
Lt























The following analysis places particular emphasis on the effect of changes in
the parameters related to nominal frictions in wages and prices, in household
access to financial markets and in the response of the nominal interest rate to
price inflation.




as a function of wage flexibility
and the fraction of financially constrained households.12 When all households
have access to the financial market (υ = 0) the figure shows that, in general, the
increase in wage flexibility improves welfare. Specifically, starting with highly
rigid wages, increases in wage flexibility improve welfare to a point where the
parameter measuring wage rigidity is around 0.6 (implying a duration of wage
contracts of 2.5 quarters) and a welfare loss of 0.076 with respect to the steady
state. After this minimum point, higher degrees of wage flexibility increase wel-
fare only slightly, generating, when wages are highly flexible (θw = 0.25 or an av-
erage duration of 1.3 quarters), a loss of welfare of 0.081 with respect to the steady
state. These results are in line with what is found in the literature regarding the
benefits of greater wage flexibility (see, for example, Galí (2013)).
The benefits, however, disappear when even a small fraction of households
face financial constraints. In this case, only starting from scenarios with extreme
wage rigidity is it possible to find welfare gains, although small, by increasing
wage flexibility. However, after exceeding the "optimal" degree of salary flexibil-
ity, the increase in wage flexibility has disastrous consequences for welfare. For
example, when 70% of households face financial constraints, the loss of welfare
associated with a high level of wage flexibility is almost 40%.
Figure 3.13 shows the mean loss as a function of the degree of wage and price
flexibility when all households have access to financial markets (panel A) and
when 70% of them have financial constraints (panel B). When there are no finan-
cial constraints, the benefits of greater wage flexibility, when accompanied by
11Galí (2013), Ascari, Colciago and Rossi (2016) and Walsh (2017) provide derivations of the wel-
fare loss function for models similar to the one presented in this paper but without capital and/or
investment.





















































high price flexibility, are clear. In fact, as the figure shows, relatively high levels
of nominal flexibility (in prices and wages) generate a level of welfare that is even
higher than that reached in the steady state. Higher levels of nominal rigidity,
both for wages and for prices, decrease welfare (weakly) monotonously.
In an economy in which a fraction of the population does not have access to
financial markets, greater wage flexibility improves welfare only in the presence
of relatively high price flexibility. When price rigidity is around the estimated
range commonly found in the literature (around θp = 0.75, i.e. with prices that
change on average once a year) the benefits of increasing wage flexibility are less
obvious, even showing a slight decrease in welfare. With higher degrees of price
rigidity, greater wage flexibility is counterproductive in terms of welfare.
Figure 3.14 shows the mean loss as a function of wage rigidity and the strength
with which the interest rate responds to price inflation when all households have
access to financial markets (panel A) and when 70% are financially restricted
(panel B). When considering the weight that the monetary authority gives to the
dynamics of inflation, the adverse effect of greater wage flexibility in the presence
of financial frictions is more evident. In the traditional model, with full partici-
pation in the asset market, greater wage flexibility increases welfare only when
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Figure 3.13: Welfare losses: wage an price flexibility
Panel A


























































































the monetary authority has a relatively strong response to inflation. The two op-
posite effects of wage flexibility on welfare explain this result (Galí (2013) found
similar results). Specifically, because greater wage flexibility reduces the volatil-
ity of the labor, which increases welfare, but at the same time reduces welfare due
to higher volatility in price and wage inflation. When the response of the mone-
tary authority to inflation is strong enough, the benefits of greater labor stability
prevail.
In contrast, when a fraction of households is hand-to-mouth, although, in
general, a stronger response to inflation increases welfare regardless of the level
of wage flexibility, the figure shows that for a given level of response to inflation,
increasing wage flexibility improves welfare only in the presence of implausibly
high initial levels of wage rigidity. Even in that case, the increase in welfare associ-
ated with greater wage flexibility is small. On the contrary, there is a considerable
decrease in welfare, for all levels of response to inflation, once the "optimal" wage
flexibility is exceeded.
In summary, and similar to the analysis of the dynamic response in Section
3.3 the claims in favor of greater wage flexibility are only maintained for a particu-
lar set of parameters and when total participation in the asset market is assumed.
Even in that case, greater wage flexibility only generates welfare improvements of
small magnitude. For most parameter values, and when a fraction of households
cannot or do not want to smooth their consumption, an increase in wage flexi-
bility is detrimental to welfare.
3.5 Conclusions
Having mechanisms at hand to help mitigate the real economic effects of reces-
sions is of paramount importance as exemplified by the recent financial crisis.
One of the most common policy suggestions to protect, to a certain extent, the
economy of shocks is the increase in labor market flexibility, among others, by
improving the freedom to negotiate labor contracts at the firm level, eliminating
the minimum wage laws and eliminating barriers to changes in wages. This last
characteristic, greater wage flexibility, is usually at the center of the discussion
because its effects on employment stability seem obvious. However, recent re-
search has shown that the relationship between greater wage flexibility and em-
ployment stability is not as direct as intuition suggests.
This paper contributes to this line of research by analyzing the effects of
greater wage flexibility on macroeconomic stability and welfare in an economy
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Figure 3.14: Welfare losses: wage flexibility and nominal interest rate response to
inflation
Panel A
























































































with nominal frictions and where a fraction of households have financial restric-
tions. The analysis is based on a calibrated New-Keynesian medium-size DSGE
model that includes characteristics that have proven to be essential for under-
standing the short-term behavior of economic activity and the response of key
macroeconomic variables after being affected by shocks.
Two findings stand out. First, the analysis shows that greater wage flexibil-
ity is counterproductive to economic stability when some households are finan-
cially constrained and, therefore, highly vulnerable to shocks in their current la-
bor income. This result, which raises doubts about the traditional recommen-
dations on the benefits of greater wage flexibility, is even more evident when the
monetary policy is ineffective because the nominal interest rate reaches its lower
bound. This highlights the relevance of monetary policy in a scenario with finan-
cial frictions.
Second, regarding welfare, I found that greater wage flexibility only improves
welfare when starting from an implausibly high level of wage rigidity and, even
in that case, the gains are small. When even a relatively small fraction of house-
holds is financially constrained, increases in wage flexibility have strong negative
effects on the entire economy.
The results also confirm the findings in the literature on the benefits of high
nominal wage flexibility when accompanied by high price flexibility in a frame-
work of complete market participation. However, this finding must be qualified
when households have financial constraints. In this case, greater wage flexibil-
ity only improves welfare when accompanied by high price flexibility. With more
rigid prices, e.g. changing on average each year (as supported by several empiri-
cal studies), the increase in wage flexibility becomes detrimental to welfare.
Finally, I found that when all households have access to credit markets, high
wage flexibility improves welfare when the response of the monetary authority
to inflation is sufficiently strong. In other words, by responding energetically to
changes in inflation, the monetary authority can counteract the negative effects
on welfare of the increase in the volatility of inflation, while at the same time
maintaining the welfare benefits associated with higher job stability. In con-
trast, with a fraction of hand-to-mouth households, greater wage flexibility is
detrimental to welfare and a strong response of the interest rate to inflation only
slightly mitigates its negative effects.
The analysis in this paper highlights the importance of financial inclusion for
the welfare of households. The results show that, in general, having access to the
financial system generates greater welfare in the economy as a whole, compared
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to the case in which even a small fraction of households have financial restric-
tions. The policy recommendation in this regard is clear. It is advisable to take
additional measures that encourage the participation of agents in the financial
markets, making emphasis on those agents that seem to be more relegated, in
particular, women, households in poor countries and those who live in rural ar-
eas. Advances in technology, particularly the rapid adoption of cell phones, have
helped with this goal and will almost certainly continue to facilitate the interac-
tion between households and financial institutions. In recent decades we have
observed significant improvements regarding financial inclusion, but there is still
a long way to go.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Response to a positive monetary shock
3.6.2 Response to a positive government shock
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Figure 3.15: Response to a positive monetary shock - I
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Figure 3.16: Response to a positive monetary shock - II
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Figure 3.17: Response to a positive government shock - I














Interest rate (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7























10-3Consumption of hand-to-mouth households (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7

























10-3 Real wage (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7



























10-3 Consumption of optimizers (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7
























10-3 Output (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7



























10-3 Labor (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7
86 CHAPTER 3. WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
Figure 3.18: Response to a positive government shock - II


























10-3 Output gap (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7





















10-3 Investment (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7























10-3 Aggregate Consumption (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7























10-4 Inflation (no ZLB)
w
 = 0.3,  = 0
w
 = 0.75,  = 0
w
 = 0.3,  = 0.7
w
 = 0.75,  = 0.7
Chapter 4
Rigid Wages & Contracts: Time-
vs. State-Dependent Wages in the
Netherlands
This chapter is based on a joint work with Burak Uras and Nathanael Vellekoop.
4.1 Introduction
Macroeconomists widely accept nominal wage rigidity as an imperfection that
may generate substantial fluctuations in unemployment and output in the short
term. The existence of nominal wage rigidity also provides a motivation for mon-
etary policy to steer macroeconomic activity. Therefore, traditional Keynesian-
ism and, more recently, New Keynesian literature, emphasize the importance of
identifying the degree of nominal wage rigidity in an economy. In this sense, a
better understanding of patterns of wage rigidity is essential for uncovering the
sources of business cycles and developing optimal policy instruments to handle
economic fluctuations.
In this paper, we use a large high-frequency micro-panel dataset on monthly
salaries for all employees in the Netherlands to explore the dynamics of nomi-
nal wage rigidity. Our research objectives are threefold: (i) We estimate nominal
wage rigidity at the industry level and, more importantly, at the worker level. (ii)
It is important to highlight that given the unique quality of the data, we decom-
posed the wage changes of the employees into components that are related to the
explicit contractual terms, with the characteristics of the firms and the industry,
and with factors associated with macroeconomic conditions. (iii) Finally, by ex-
87
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ploiting the detailed structure of the data, we analyze the determinants of nom-
inal wage adjustments. In particular, we study whether in the Dutch economy,
both in aggregate terms and disaggregated according to contractual characteris-
tics, nominal wage adjustments are state-dependent or time-dependent.
Research that uses microeconomic data to estimate the degree of nominal
wage rigidity has concentrated mainly on uncovering the presence of down-
ward wage rigidities, specifically, in the frequency of wage freezes. Some ex-
amples of this line of research are Mclaughlin (1994); Kahn (1997); Altonji and
Devereux (2000); Gottschalk (2005); Fehr and Goette (2005); and Dickens et al.
(2007). A few studies such as Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012), Barattieri,
Basu and Gottschalk (2014), Kurmann and Mcentarfer (2017) and Ehrlich and
Montes (2017), which use highly disaggregated data, also investigate the inter-
action between the frequency of nominal wage adjustments and delayed wage
adjustments over the business cycle.
In this paper, we expand the existing literature on staggered nominal wage
adjustments and fill an important gap by providing a detailed empirical analysis
of industry, firm, and worker-level channels that are likely to explain state depen-
dence versus time dependence in nominal wage stickiness. Specifically, using a
micro-detailed approach we aim to understand which particular characteristics
of employee-employer relationships, contracts, firms and industry, induce nom-
inal wages to remain rigid during economic downturns.
A recent study that is closely related to our research is Sigurdsson and Sig-
urdardottir (2016), whose analysis with administrative data from Iceland reveals
the presence of time and state dependency components in the setting of nominal
wages. The authors’ study shows that in Iceland downward rigidities of nominal
wages are present to a large extent, and that wages tend to contract in response to
recessionary trends, which indicates the relevance of state-dependent wage set-
ting. The Icelandic administrative data, however, to some extent restrict the con-
clusions reached by the authors on the deeper determinants of state-dependent
salaries, since they can only contrast the behavior of nominal wages across in-
dustries, occupations and size of the firms. In this current study, we use ad-
ministrative data from the Netherlands, which given its structure, allows us to
make detailed comparisons between different employment relationships, con-
tracts, occupations, firms and industry characteristics. The ability to make such
comparisons also provides us with a framework to investigate the determinants
of state dependence versus time dependence on wage determination.
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Several theoretical foundations have been highlighted in the literature that
could explain why firms may hesitate to cut wages during economic downturns.
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) provides a review of the theoretical literature and
conducts a firm-level survey to isolate the different theories of wage rigidity qual-
itatively. However, the absence of observational data in the analysis of Campbell
and Kamlani (1997) limits the applicability of their conclusions. Some promising
theories for understanding wage rigidity are contract theory, the theory of im-
plicit contracts, theories of efficiency wages, the theory of fair wages and the the-
ory of insider-outside information. The contracts approach to wage rigidities, as
proposed by Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980), suggests that long-term employee-
firm agreements require that wages be fixed in advance, which prevents wage
negotiations from taking place on a regular basis. Advocates of implicit contract
theory, such as Azariadis (1975) and Stiglitz (1984), argue that workers’ risk aver-
sion would induce them to prefer stable wages during the business cycle to wages
that increase during expansions and decline during recessions. Therefore, risk
aversion would give incentives to firms and workers to come to an implicit un-
derstanding of keeping wages stable during the business cycle. The implicit the-
ory of contracts would imply that, wherever wages are rigid, firms are expected
to pay relatively lower wages by avoiding to compensate for risk premia.
Our empirical analysis uses Dutch data at the employee level that cover from
2006 to 2012 (84 months). The details of the data will be elaborated below. Our
preliminary results show that the frequency of nominal wage adjustments in the
Netherlands coincides with the aggregate wage rigidity documented recently for
other European countries using high frequency data on wages such as for France
(Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012)), Luxembourg (Lünnemann and Wintr
(2009)) and Iceland (Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016)).
We divide the empirical analysis into two parts. In the first part we provide a
description of the nominal wage stickiness of the Dutch economy. In this prelim-
inary phase we find that nominal wages are downward rigid across a wide range
of industrial clusters. We also document a clear seasonal pattern in the degree of
rigidity. Likewise, we document significant heterogeneity in nominal wage rigid-
ity across industries and occupations, as well as regarding the size of firms. As
a unique contribution of our research, we find empirical evidence that the con-
tractual terms of employees are an important determinant of the degree of nom-
inal wage rigidity. Specifically, the number of hours worked, the duration of the
contract and the status of the employment relationship turn out to be important
sources of heterogeneity in the nominal wage rigidity among workers.
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These findings not only help to understand the determinants of aggregate
nominal wage rigidity, but are also increasingly relevant given the change in com-
position observed in the participation of different types of contract and employ-
ment policies during the period of analysis. Specifically, the change observed in
the Dutch economy towards more flexible labor relations, in particular the grow-
ing participation of on-call workers, flexible contracts, and part-time contracts,
which we also discussed.
Moreover, the duration analysis of a change in the contract wage confirms
earlier findings in the literature regarding the shape of the hazard function. Ac-
cordingly, we find that the hazard has two spikes, one at 12 months and one at 24
months.
In the second part of our paper, using a formal econometric exercise, we study
time-dependence and state-dependence in the determination of nominal wages
in the Netherlands. We find that time- and state-dependency (this is represented
by changes in macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and unemployment)
determine the probability of observing both increases and nominal wage reduc-
tions. Time- and state-dependency affect the probability of observing changes
in nominal wages for the pooled sample, that is, without disaggregation by type
of contract, but also when considering the different types of contracts separately.
In this last case, we find that the effect of time- and state-dependency is not ho-
mogeneous through the different contracts.
Thus, for example, we find that increases in nominal wages in contracts with
flexible hours depend to a greater extent on the temporal dimension while not
reacting to the evolution of accumulated unemployment. In similar lines, for
tenured contracts, the probability of a wage increase does not depend on changes
in accumulated inflation and only slightly responds to variations in accumulated
unemployment. The results show a sharp contrast between full-time and part-
time contracts. In the former, the response of the probability of observing a wage
increase to changes in accumulated inflation is almost double compared to the
latter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a summary
of the theories of wage rigidity while Section 4.3 summarizes the institutional
setting for wage determination in the Netherlands. Section 4.4 describes in detail
the data we use. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present our empirical results. Section 4.7
concludes.
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4.2 Theories of Wage Rigidity: Time-Dependent vs. State-
Dependent Wage Setting
There are two broad classes of theories that aim to describe the behavior of wage
adjustments: time-dependent and state-dependent models of wage determina-
tion. According to time-dependent models of wage adjustments, the state of the
economy does not play any role in determining the likelihood and the size of
a wage change. Earlier examples of time-dependent wage setting include Fis-
cher (1977) and Taylor (1980), who propose that wages remain constant for an
exogenous and deterministic number of periods, such as a particular number of
months or a year. Fisher-Taylor type of time-dependent wage setting can be mo-
tivated by the behavior of wages observed among unionized workers. Also, in
this family of models, a feature pioneered in Calvo’s famous 1983 article suggests
a random duration in nominal adjustments.1 Building upon this feature, many
New-Keynesian macro models, such as Smets and Wouters (2003), assume that
wages change at random with a probability to re-optimize wages that remains
constant over time. Although Calvo type wage stickiness is hard to support with
an empirically justifiable microfoundation, the tractability that it induces makes
Calvo-stickness a desirable assumption to apply in New-Keynesian models.
Models with state-dependent wage setting build upon the theoretical argu-
ment that fixed costs to renegotiate employment contracts prevent frequent ad-
justments in wages. Assumptions proposed by Caplin and Spulber (1987) and
Fehr and Goette (2005) argue that fixed cost of wage adjustments imply that the
likelihood and the size of wage changes vary over time with the conditions of the
macroeconomy, the industry and the firm.
In this paper we aim to disentangle the presence of time-vs-state dependent
wage setting using a rich data-set for the case of the Netherlands.
4.3 Institutional Setting
The Netherlands is a small, open economy and part of the eurozone for the years
of our study. With a population of 16.9 million inhabitants in 2015, it is more
populous than the state of Illinois, but smaller than the state of New York.
1Although Calvo (1983) develops a model of sticky-prices, many papers in the literature imple-
mented Calvo stickiness also for the case of wages.
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Table 4.1: Composition of fixed-term contracts
Percentage
On-call 31%
Temporary, perspective of indefinite 15%
Temp agency 14%
Temporary >=1 year 11%
Temporary <1 year 10%
Temporary contract, no contract hours 12%
Indefinite contract, no contract hours 7%
In 2015 there were about 8.29 million people in the labor force, with 6.9 mil-
lion workers and 1.38 million self-employed. The three largest industries in terms
of workers are health care (16%), trade (15%), and manufacturing (10%).
Important for our analysis is the distinction between workers with a contract
of indefinite length (74% as of 2015) and a fixed-term contract (26%). As Table
4.1 shows, the group of fixed-term contracts is quite heterogeneous: 31% of the
workers with a fixed-term contract are on-call; 19% have no hours defined, and
14% work for temporary work agencies (Dutch Labor Force Survey Statistics for
2015). Of the remaining workers with fixed-term contracts, 10% of the workers
have a temporary contract for less than a year, and 11% have a temporary contract
longer than a year.
Legally there are no limits on the length of time of the first fixed-term contract
an employer offers, but there are regulations for the maximum number of suc-
cessive contracts the employer can offer before a fixed-term contract alters into
a contract of indefinite length (OECD EPL database, 2013). After three successive
fixed-term contracts and/or a period of 36 months covered (including prolonga-
tions), the fourth (or next) contract is automatically of indefinite length. Excep-
tions to this rule are possible in collective bargaining agreements. In practice,
the difference between temporary contracts and contracts of indefinite duration
is the degree of employment protection. Termination of a labor contract by the
employer involves either the courts or the public employment service (OECD EPL
database, 2013), with an equal distribution of cases between the two. The courts
are more expensive in terms of severance pay but are typically shorter and less
administratively burdensome for the employer. Severance pay depends on the
tenure of employment, gross wages and some discretionary factor applied by the
courts. The average OECD score for job protection of workers with a regular con-
tract is 2.04 in 2013 (on a scale from 0, no protection, to 6, maximum job pro-
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tection). Workers with regular contracts in the Netherlands are better protected
(score of 2.82) compared to the OECD. The opposite is true for workers with a
temporary contract: the OECD average is 1.72, whereas the score for Dutch work-
ers with a temporary contract is 0.94.
With respect to hours worked, the Dutch labor market can be characterized
by a high degree of labor flexibility. In 2015 almost half of all workers worked less
than the standard number of hours: 26.3% of the men and 75.1% of the women.
The share of involuntary part-time work is very low: 8.6% of part-time workers
work less than fulltime involuntarily (OECD, 2015). Overtime hours are measured
in our data to the extent that hours are paid at a higher wage rate, e.g. weekend
and night shifts in certain industries. Overtime premiums and overtime hours
regulation are typically covered in collective bargaining agreements.
Trade union density, defined as the number of union members over the num-
ber of wage and salary earners, is with 17.8% comparable to the OECD average
of 17.0% (OECD, 2013). For comparison with some of the mentioned studies,
trade union density is lower in France (7.7%) and the United States (10.7%), and
higher in Luxembourg (32.8%) and Iceland (82.4%). Union membership is low,
but coverage of wage bargaining is relatively large. Four bargaining regimes can
be distinguished (Hartog, Leuven and Teulings (2002)): company level bargain-
ing, industry level bargaining, mandatory extension of an industry agreement,
and no collective bargaining.
Figure 4.15 in Appendix 4.8 shows the behavior of GDP growth, CPI inflation
and unemployment in the Netherlands in the period 2006-2012.
4.4 Data
One reason empirical research on wage rigidity is limited - especially to the end
of identifying the models and theoretical channels that drive the degree of wage
rigidity - is the lack of high-frequency microdata, which provide detailed infor-
mation on contracts between employees and employers. In this respect, there
are two fronts of the state of the art datasets that are required to conduct this
research project. On the one hand, to capture potential rigidities in wage adjust-
ments over the business cycle frequency, the data should be at a monthly (or at
the least of quarterly) frequency. On the other hand, the details of employment
contracts should provide enough information about the duration of the agree-
ment and other features of the employee-employer relationship to allow for a
thorough investigation of the sources of wage rigidity.
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The analysis in this paper is based on anonymized non-public census-data
from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) for the period of 2006-2012. In particular, the
dataset allows us to use information on firms from the General Business Register
(ABR), personal characteristics of individuals affiliated with municipal adminis-
tration registers (GBA) and monthly quantitative and qualitative data regarding
jobs and wages of employees in Dutch companies (POLISBUS).2 Firms collect
the monthly wage data and report it to the unemployment insurance agency. All
legal workers are covered by unemployment insurance, and unemployment in-
surance is based on the number of years of work at all firms (including gaps),
and the wages earned in the 12 months prior to unemployment, as well as hours
worked. The fact that firms report the data minimizes the measurement error
in wages and hours reported. Moreover, we observe in our data the universe of
firms, both public and private.
In the first quarter of 2007, the census comprises around 980,000 firms with
approximately 8,05 million workers among 480 industries (5-digit NACE), from
which, due to computational constraints, we take a 5% random sample strati-
fied by sector and firm size. The data includes monthly contract wages, variable
compensation, payroll taxes and hours worked. At the level of the firm 5-digit
industry code, collective labor agreement code (if any), and firm balance sheets
and income statements can be linked to workers at incorporated firms. The ob-
servational unit is defined as the relationship between an employee and the em-
ployee’s job at a firm (i.e., wage trajectory) which can be followed for up to seven
years in our sample. The use of the wage trajectory as our observation unit means
that the wage changes discussed in this paper are within job wage changes. As
standard in the literature, our measurement unit is hourly wages, where wages
are given by the contract wage.
Measuring the nominal rigidity in wages is challenging for two reasons: low
frequency (annual) data and measurement error in wages, hours or both. The
dataset we use in our research helps us with both issues. First, the employee-
level dataset is at a monthly frequency giving us the opportunity to observe the
exact month of a wage change within a given wage trajectory. We also observe
the exact month of a new wage trajectory, as well as the month of a job exit and
entry. Moreover, we can decompose total monthly compensation into the con-
tract wage and variable compensation. These are important improvements on
existing research. Most available microeconomic datasets on wages are at an
2Under certain conditions, these microdata are accessible for statistical and scientific research.
For further information please contact Statistics Netherlands at microdata@cbs.nl.
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annual frequency making the estimation of short-run wage rigidities quite im-
precise. Only few studies provide evidence on wage rigidities at a quarterly fre-
quency, such as Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) for France, and Barattieri,
Basu and Gottschalk (2014) for the United States; or at the monthly frequency:
Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) for Luxembourg, and Sigurdsson and Sigurdard-
ottir (2016) for Iceland. To the end of contractual details, our data differentiates
between variable and base compensation of employees, provides information on
hours worked, and the type of contracts (fixed-term versus permanent). The sec-
ond challenge is measurement error. Gottschalk (2005) finds that measurement
error in surveys can be substantial, due to imperfect recall or unwillingness to
report hours worked or wages received (or both).
Our research isolates the effects of explicit contractual terms on estimated
wage rigidities from that of factors due to firm, industry and macroeconomic
characteristics. Moreover, we observe all employees at each firm, which allows
us to identify each firm-worker pair in the data uniquely. An additional novel
feature of our data is that we observe start and end of unemployment spells and
can precisely infer wage changes of job-finders.
Our empirical methodology to estimate wage rigidity follows the recent lit-
erature (e.g., Gottschalk (2005); Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012); Barattieri,
Basu and Gottschalk (2014)) and Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016).
Data Treatment. Even though we are dealing with high-quality administrative
data, some observations should be excluded because it is likely that they contain
measurement errors or are the result of misreporting. Specifically, we leave out
any observations with nonsense values (e.g. negative nominal wages or num-
ber hours worked) and to trim possible outliers, we drop the first and/or the last
percentile in most of the variables.
The data cleaning process, however, does not entirely eliminate the presence
of measurement error, or misreporting, which may obscure our estimation of the
level of wage rigidity. Specifically, we could potentially find spurious changes in
wages that are the product of misreporting or due to rounding. In order to differ-
entiate ?actual? wage changes from the spurious ones, and reduce the bias gener-
ated by the latter, we implement an identification strategy that is standard in the
literature. In general terms, the identification strategy assumes that a step func-
tion can describe wage changes. That is, we assume (as intuition dictates) that
individual wages stay constant for some unknown number of months and then,
when they change, they change in a discrete manner. One way to implement this
identification strategy is using a structural break test. However, this econometric
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approach used by Gottschalk (2005) is computationally expensive and becomes
infeasible when the number of wage trajectories is big, as in our case.3 Instead,
we implement the identification strategy using a heuristic approach which can
be summarized as follows:4
1. We eliminate the last observation of a wage trajectory if this includes a wage
change. This allows us to take into account any possible payment received
by the employee at the end of the labor relationship, such as severance pay-
ments. Symmetrically, we eliminate the first observation of a wage trajec-
tory if it is followed by an immediate change in wage as well. This way we
take into account any possible “extra” payments that wage earner receives
in the first month of the employment relationship, e.g. sign-on bonuses.
2. We drop wage trajectories that last for less than 3-months. The idea behind
this is to avoid the possible bias generated by very short and potentially
volatile wage trajectories.
3. We eliminate wage trajectories where the number of wage changes is
greater than 80% of the total possible number of changes (e.g., a wage
trajectory of 12 months with ten wage changes is dropped from our anal-
ysis). This is in line with our overall identification strategy: wages stay
constant for some unknown period.
4. We correct wage trajectories that contain V-shape or inverted V-shape wage
changes, i.e. a wage reduction followed immediately by an increase (or vice
versa). This kind of sharp wage reversals are potentially due to misreport-
ing or due to rounding error. In our analysis, we take such sharp wage-
reversals as a “no-change” in wage.
5. Finally, we correct wage trajectories that contain wage reversals in a time
span of three months, i.e. a wage change that is reverted after two or three
months leaving the wage exactly as before the change. We consider those
wage-reversals as a “no-change” in wage.5
Figure 4.1 depicts the implementation of the above algorithm for a fictional indi-
vidual over a 24-month wage trajectory.6
3See Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) for an application.
4A similar approach is used in Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) and Lünnemann and Wintr
(2009).
5Table 4.16 in Appendix 4.8 shows the number of observations lost in each step of the cleaning
process.
6The wage trajectory in this figure does not correspond to the wage trajectory of any individual
in our sample nor in the population. The numbers were fabricated for illustrative purposes.
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Figure 4.1: Raw and adjusted wage trajectory













Note: The wage trajectory in this figure does not correspond to the wage trajectory of any individual in our
sample nor in the population. The numbers were fabricated for illustrative purposes.
4.5 Wage Rigidity: Descriptive Analysis
In this section we conduct a duration analysis and a multinomial logit estima-
tion to document the patterns of employee-level wage adjustments in the Nether-
lands. We split our results in two. At first, we present a set of findings, some of
which have also been highlighted in the previous literature for other European
countries and the US. We then show and discuss another set of findings that are
novel for the literature.
The baseline results - that we present in tables 4.2-4.7 and figures 4.4-4.9 -
reveal the presence of rigid wages, and in particular downward wage rigidities
throughout sectors, firm-size groups and employment types. This means when
we compare wage “decreases” against “increases”, contractions in wages are sig-
nificantly less common than rising wages. These results are in line with those
found in the literature as we will delineate below.
Table 4.2 shows that in the aggregate we capture a frequency of “no-change
in wages” of 84.9%. This degree of wage rigidity is comparable to the findings
of Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016), who document 87% probability of “no
change in wages” for the case of Iceland, and Lünnemann and Wintr (2009), who
document 85.7%- 93% probability of “no change in wages” for the case of Lux-
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Table 4.2: Wage rigidity
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
Aggregate 3.2 [3.0; 3.3] 84.9 [84.6; 85.2] 11.9 [11.7; 12.1] -8.9 4.8
Employment policy
Full-time 2.9 [2.6; 3.2] 85.5 [84.8; 86.1] 11.6 [11.1; 12.1] -9.5 4.2
Part-time 3.5 [3.2; 3.7] 84.3 [83.9; 84.8] 12.2 [11.8; 12.6] -8.7 5.4
Employment relationship
Fixed 3.0 [2.8; 3.3] 85.2 [84.7; 85.7] 11.8 [11.4; 12.2] -9.0 4.8
Flexible 8.1 [7.5; 8.7] 76.1 [75.5; 76.7] 15.8 [15.4; 16.3] -9.5 5.8
Type of contract
Tenured 4.2 [3.8; 4.7] 82.7 [81.9; 83.4] 13.1 [12.7; 13.5] -11.5 7.0
Untenured 2.9 [2.7; 3.2] 85.4 [84.8; 85.9] 11.7 [11.3; 12.2] -7.9 4.1
Not applicable 3.8 [3.7; 3.9] 91.4 [91.2; 91.6] 4.8 [4.7; 4.9] -15.4 13.3
Type of relationship
Marriage 3.0 [2.7; 3.2] 85.8 [85.2; 86.3] 11.3 [10.8; 11.7] -8.5 4.2
Partnership 3.0 [2.7; 3.3] 85.1 [84.5; 85.6] 11.9 [11.4; 12.4] -8.5 4.1
Single 3.4 [3.1; 3.7] 84.0 [83.4; 84.5] 12.6 [12.2; 13.0] -9.4 5.5
Gender
Male 3.2 [2.9; 3.6] 85.3 [84.6; 85.9] 11.5 [11.0; 12.0] -8.6 4.7
Female 3.1 [2.9; 3.4] 84.6 [84.1; 85.1] 12.2 [11.9; 12.6] -9.2 4.9
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
emburg. Both of these studies - like in our approach - use monthly data. Using
quarterly data Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) find a wage rigidity of 62%
in France and Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) uncover a wage rigidity of
78.4%-83.7% in the US. The quarterly equivalent of our wage rigidity is 62.1% of
no-change, which coincides with the degree of rigidity documented in France by
Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012).
Figure 4.2 shows the estimated conditional hazard probability of a wage
change based on the raw data. This figure indicates that wages are more likely to
change every 12 months, and to a lesser extent if the wage remains unchanged
for two years. More importantly, the high probability of observing a wage change
every period depicted in Figure 4.2 reveals the presence of significant measure-
ment errors in the raw data.
Figure 4.3 presents the hazard function of a wage change based on the data
obtained after the cleaning procedure explained in detail in Section 4.4. The
highest probability of a wage change is observed after 12 months: an employee
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who had an unchanged wage for 11 months has about a 50% chance of observing
a change in his wage in the 12th month.
Similarly, if the wage remained unchanged for 23 months, the worker has a
probability close to 20% of observing a wage change in month 24. A similar haz-
ard function - with peaks in 12th and 24th months - was also documented by
Gottschalk (2005) and Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) for the case of the
United States.
Moreover, Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3 reveal a clear seasonality (synchroniza-
tion) in wage changes. We find that wages are more likely to rise in January and
July. Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) found a similar pattern in Iceland but
the peaks in their work are documented to be in January and June. Similarly, us-
ing the administrative data from Luxemburg Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) un-
covered a peak in January. Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) also showed a
synchronization in wage changes for the case of France. Finally, for the US Barat-
tieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) showed weak evidence of synchronization. Ad-
ditionally, our data also points out that there is evidence of staggered wages at
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the aggregate level. Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3 show that most of the wage changes
are distributed over the course of the year.7
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.4 (in Appendix 4.8) show that wages in the Netherlands
have become more rigid after the financial crisis. Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir
(2016) found a similar pattern regarding the increase of wage rigidity after the
crisis for the case of Iceland. However, it is important to note that the “economic
recovery” had not been observed yet in the data that they use, because the last
period for the analysis is 2010 in Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016).8
The results we obtain to the end of variations in marital status and gender of
the employee and their implications for wage rigidities are in line with the find-
ings of the previous literature as well. With respect to the marital status the rigidi-
ties are comparable between married and non-married, while married workers
tend to exhibit rigidities to a larger extent (as also evidenced in Lünnemann and
Wintr (2009)). Similarly, results are very close between male and female employ-
ees, but male workers appear to have more rigid wage profiles compared to fe-
male (also as in Lünnemann and Wintr (2009)).
7For France, Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) found a stronger evidence of staggering (the
probability of a wage increase is greater than 20% in every quarter).
8However, it is too early to talk about a sustained recovery since the Netherlands registered a
negative GDP growth in the last year of our analysis.
















































Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
January 5.1 [4.5; 5.7] 58.9 [56.7; 61.2] 36.0 [33.7; 38.2] -10.0 4.8
February 1.3 [1.2; 1.5] 86.9 [85.9; 87.9] 11.8 [10.8; 12.8] -10.9 6.7
March 4.3 [3.8; 4.9] 88.2 [87.2; 89.2] 7.4 [6.6; 8.3] -8.0 6.0
April 3.2 [2.8; 3.6] 84.8 [83.2; 86.4] 12.0 [10.3; 13.7] -9.1 4.4
May 3.9 [3.5; 4.4] 86.5 [85.2; 87.8] 9.6 [8.5; 10.7] -7.9 4.2
June 2.1 [1.9; 2.3] 85.1 [83.2; 87.0] 12.7 [10.8; 14.7] -10.7 4.0
July 3.1 [2.9; 3.4] 80.1 [77.4; 82.7] 16.8 [14.0; 19.6] -10.8 3.3
August 2.7 [2.5; 3.0] 84.2 [82.2; 86.1] 13.1 [11.2; 14.9] -8.6 4.3
September 2.5 [2.3; 2.7] 89.1 [88.4; 89.7] 8.5 [7.8; 9.1] -8.9 6.5
October 2.8 [2.6; 3.0] 88.3 [87.3; 89.2] 8.9 [8.0; 9.7] -8.2 4.9
November 2.9 [2.6; 3.1] 90.2 [89.5; 90.9] 6.9 [6.3; 7.4] -8.6 5.9
December 4.9 [4.3; 5.5] 89.7 [88.6; 90.8] 5.4 [4.7; 6.1] -8.6 5.2
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
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Table 4.4: Year
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
2006 2.4 [2.2; 2.7] 85.0 [83.6; 86.4] 12.6 [11.2; 13.9] -10.6 5.0
2007 2.6 [2.4; 2.9] 83.7 [83.1; 84.2] 13.7 [13.2; 14.2] -11.1 4.8
2008 3.6 [3.2; 3.9] 83.1 [82.5; 83.7] 13.4 [12.9; 13.8] -9.1 5.5
2009 3.2 [2.9; 3.5] 84.3 [83.7; 84.9] 12.5 [12.0; 12.9] -8.6 4.9
2010 3.3 [3.0; 3.6] 87.4 [86.7; 88.1] 9.3 [8.7; 9.9] -9.1 5.2
2011 3.4 [3.1; 3.8] 85.1 [84.3; 85.9] 11.4 [10.8; 12.1] -7.9 4.3
2012 3.7 [3.3; 4.1] 85.6 [84.9; 86.2] 10.8 [10.2; 11.3] -8.0 4.2
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
Figure 4.5: Years
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Figure 4.6: Age
















As a novel piece of evidence Figure 4.6 and Table 4.5 uncover a clear posi-
tive correlation between age and wage rigidity.9 For instance, the probability of
a no-change in wages grows monotonically with the age of the employee until
they reach 73 years (for employees over 73 years of age, the probability of a non-
change decreases slightly). Therefore, while for employees between 63 and 73
years the likelihood of a no-change in wages is 88.1%, this likelihood is 77.7%
for employees under 23 years of age. We observe a monotonic negative relation-
ship between the age of the employee and the probability of a wage increase. As
Table 4.5 shows young workers are twice as likely to experience a wage increase
compared to their older counterparts. The negative link between the age of the
employee and the likelihood of a wage reduction shows less variance than for the
cases of no-change and wage increases.
The implication of the estimated correlation between wage rigidity and work-
ers’ age gains additional relevance once we observe the behavior of the age
groups during the observation period. Figure 4.7 shows this evolution between
2006 and 2012. We can see that, in general, the age groups with less rigidity
9 Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) discuss the association between age and wage rigidity as well,
but in their case age cannot be separated from marital status.
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Table 4.5: Age
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
13-23 5.4 [5.2; 5.6] 77.7 [77.3; 78.1] 16.9 [16.6; 17.3] -10.0 9.1
23-33 3.4 [3.1; 3.6] 83.3 [82.7; 83.8] 13.4 [12.9; 13.8] -10.0 5.2
33-43 3.1 [2.9; 3.4] 85.0 [84.6; 85.4] 11.8 [11.5; 12.2] -8.8 4.4
43-53 2.8 [2.6; 3.1] 86.0 [85.4; 86.6] 11.2 [10.7; 11.6] -7.7 3.8
53-63 2.6 [2.3; 2.9] 87.6 [86.9; 88.2] 9.8 [9.3; 10.3] -8.1 3.8
63-73 4.0 [3.6; 4.4] 88.1 [87.3; 88.8] 7.9 [7.5; 8.4] -11.3 5.7
73- 4.4 [3.9; 5.0] 87.9 [86.8; 89.0] 7.7 [6.9; 8.4] -11.8 7.5
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
in wages, ages between 23 and 53 years, have decreased their participation in
the working population. In contrast, employees over 53 have shown a steady
increase in their share.
Finally, we also document the heterogeneity of wage rigidities with respect to
firms’ size and industry classifications. First, Figure 4.8 and Table 4.6 illustrate
that wages become more flexible with the size of the company, which was also
highlighted in the past literature.10 Also, as documented in the past literature,
we show that the probability of observing a wage increase is positively related
to firm size.11 We also find a negative relationship between firm size and the
probability of a wage-contraction - as in Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012),
which differs from the findings of Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) and Lün-
nemann and Wintr (2009), who show that the probability of observing a wage
decrease is essentially independent of firm size. Second, sectoral comparisons
reveal that for workers at municipalities, schools and subsidized sectors wages
are more downward rigid compared to the private sector, as illustrated in Table
4.7 (Figure 4.9). Further decomposition of the sectors in industries shows that, for
instance, wages in the Telecommunication industry are the least-rigid whereas
the wages of the Banking industry are most rigid - with a substantial amount of
heterogeneity in the rigidity of wages across the spectrum of industries.12
Novel evidence. Employment contract details in our administrative data pro-
vide us with a novel source of variation at the employee level and allows to ex-
10Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) and Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) find a similar empir-
ical pattern, while Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) find an inverted U-shaped - with more
wage rigidity for the case of mid-size firms.
11The same pattern is observed by Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016), Lünnemann and Wintr
(2009) and Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012)
12Table 4.17 in Appendix 4.8 shows a sectoral classification at a higher level of aggregation.
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Figure 4.7: Participation of age groups
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Table 4.6: Business size (number of employees)
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
2 4.3 [4.1; 4.5] 86.7 [86.4; 87.0] 9.0 [8.8; 9.2] -9.1 7.9
3 to 4 4.3 [4.2; 4.4] 86.0 [85.8; 86.2] 9.7 [9.6; 9.9] -9.0 7.3
5 to 9 4.2 [4.1; 4.3] 85.5 [85.3; 85.8] 10.2 [10.1; 10.4] -8.5 6.5
10 to 19 4.1 [4.0; 4.3] 85.0 [84.8; 85.2] 10.9 [10.7; 11.0] -8.7 6.0
20 to 49 4.0 [3.8; 4.2] 84.3 [83.9; 84.7] 11.7 [11.4; 12.0] -9.5 5.5
50 to 99 3.6 [3.4; 3.9] 84.0 [83.5; 84.6] 12.3 [11.9; 12.7] -10.8 5.1
100 to 149 3.2 [2.8; 3.6] 84.9 [84.1; 85.7] 11.9 [11.4; 12.4] -10.3 5.1
150 to 199 3.3 [2.6; 4.1] 84.5 [83.2; 85.8] 12.2 [11.3; 13.0] -9.0 4.7
200 to 249 3.0 [2.3; 3.6] 85.3 [84.0; 86.6] 11.8 [10.7; 12.9] -8.7 4.4
250 to 499 2.9 [2.4; 3.3] 83.3 [81.8; 84.7] 13.9 [12.6; 15.2] -7.8 3.8
500 to 999 2.4 [2.1; 2.8] 84.8 [83.7; 85.8] 12.8 [11.9; 13.7] -6.7 3.5
1000 to 1999 2.1 [1.5; 2.7] 85.1 [82.9; 87.4] 12.8 [11.0; 14.5] -12.3 4.7
2000 or more 2.4 [1.4; 3.5] 85.0 [82.7; 87.4] 12.5 [10.7; 14.4] -7.4 3.5
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
plore a set of empirical regularities, which the previous literature did not concen-
trate on. As we highlight in Table 4.2 we observe that employees with a flexible
hours employment relationship have substantially lower degrees of wage rigidity
- when it comes to both downward and upward adjustments in wages - compared
to employees with fixed hours employment relationships.13 The frequency of no
change is 76.1% for the case of flexible hours contracts, while it is 85.2% for fixed
hours contracts. Note that, in the Netherlands, the participation of employees
with flexible contracts has increased considerably during the period of analysis
(Figure 4.10). On the contrary, the participation of fixed contracts, although still
a majority, has shown a constant decrease.
Although not as striking, our data also captures a difference in the degree of
rigidity of wages when tenured and untenured contracts are compared against
each other. Even small differences in the level of wage rigidity between these con-
tracts can have important implications given how the participation of tenured
and untenured contracts has evolved between 2006 and 2012. Figure 4.11 shows
that the percentage of tenured contracts was relatively low in 2006, but it in-
creased significantly in a period as short as six years (an increase of around ten
percentage points). We observe the opposite behavior, but with the same mag-
nitude, for untenured contracts.
13Flexible employment relationships include temporary workers and on-call. Fixed relation-
ships correspond to directors, interns, SWS-er and rest. tables 4.14 and 4.15 in Appendix 4.8 shows
the distribution of the different type of contracts in our sample.
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Table 4.7: Sector
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
Banks 2.0 [1.2; 2.8] 89.0 [87.4; 90.5] 9.1 [7.9; 10.2] -13.2 6.5
Painters 2.7 [2.1; 3.3] 88.7 [86.2; 91.3] 8.5 [6.1; 10.9] -9.6 7.5
Chemise industry 3.3 [1.5; 5.1] 88.4 [85.3; 91.6] 8.3 [6.5; 10.1] -6.2 4.6
Work and (re) integration 2.1 [-0.1; 4.3] 87.9 [83.8; 92.1] 10.0 [7.5; 12.5] -8.9 3.4
Government, prov, municipalities, water 1.2 [0.8; 1.5] 87.7 [86.7; 88.8] 11.1 [10.3; 11.9] -4.4 2.4
Port companies 3.7 [3.0; 4.5] 87.5 [86.2; 88.8] 8.8 [8.1; 9.5] -7.7 6.1
Private bus transport 4.2 [0.6; 7.8] 87.3 [83.7; 90.8] 8.5 [7.5; 9.6] -11.2 6.9
Business services II 3.8 [3.5; 4.1] 87.2 [86.6; 87.9] 9.0 [8.5; 9.4] -9.1 6.8
Business services I 4.1 [3.3; 5.0] 87.2 [86.3; 88.2] 8.6 [8.2; 9.0] -9.0 7.0
Government, education and science 1.8 [1.5; 2.1] 87.1 [86.2; 88.0] 11.1 [10.4; 11.7] -12.8 5.4
Business services III 3.7 [3.2; 4.3] 87.0 [86.0; 88.1] 9.3 [8.6; 9.9] -9.4 6.5
Publisher 4.4 [3.3; 5.5] 86.9 [85.0; 88.8] 8.6 [7.2; 10.0] -10.3 8.9
Wholesale II 3.4 [3.1; 3.7] 86.8 [86.0; 87.6] 9.8 [9.0; 10.6] -8.5 5.3
Wholesale of wood and wood preparation 4.8 [3.4; 6.3] 86.6 [84.5; 88.7] 8.6 [7.5; 9.6] -8.0 6.6
Cultural institutions Premium Group loose 3.0 [2.3; 3.8] 86.2 [84.7; 87.7] 10.7 [9.8; 11.7] -7.3 5.2
Textile Industry 3.8 [3.1; 4.5] 86.2 [84.6; 87.8] 10.0 [8.5; 11.5] -9.7 7.1
Wholesale I 4.6 [3.0; 6.2] 86.1 [84.6; 87.6] 9.3 [8.9; 9.7] -8.0 6.1
Other branches of business and profession 4.0 [3.4; 4.5] 85.9 [85.1; 86.8] 10.1 [9.3; 10.9] -8.2 6.2
Carpenters 2.8 [1.9; 3.7] 85.6 [83.0; 88.3] 11.6 [9.1; 14.1] -8.3 4.8
Printing industry excl photographers 3.6 [2.9; 4.2] 85.4 [84.1; 86.6] 11.0 [10.3; 11.8] -12.3 5.3
Retail 4.3 [4.1; 4.5] 85.2 [84.8; 85.6] 10.5 [10.2; 10.8] -9.0 6.8
Other passenger land and air 3.6 [2.3; 4.9] 85.2 [82.9; 87.4] 11.2 [9.1; 13.3] -11.3 6.4
Insurance and health insurance funds 2.6 [1.3; 3.9] 85.1 [83.1; 87.1] 12.3 [10.1; 14.5] -11.5 4.8
Government. other institutions 3.8 [2.4; 5.2] 84.4 [80.8; 87.9] 11.9 [9.4; 14.4] -5.9 3.4
Slaughterhouse 3.8 [3.2; 4.3] 84.3 [82.8; 85.9] 11.9 [10.6; 13.2] -8.4 6.8
Inland shiping 5.4 [4.4; 6.3] 84.1 [82.2; 86.0] 10.5 [9.4; 11.7] -8.8 9.9
Metal and engineering companies 3.6 [3.3; 3.8] 84.0 [83.6; 84.3] 12.5 [12.2; 12.7] -8.9 5.5
Wood, brush and packaging industry 5.2 [3.7; 6.7] 83.7 [81.2; 86.2] 11.1 [9.7; 12.5] -8.1 6.0
Health, mental and Maatsch bell 2.9 [2.4; 3.4] 83.4 [82.7; 84.1] 13.7 [13.4; 14.1] -8.8 4.3
Stone, cement, glass and ceramic industry 3.4 [2.5; 4.3] 83.3 [80.1; 86.4] 13.4 [10.1; 16.7] -7.1 4.0
Group farming business premium loose 4.9 [4.3; 5.4] 83.2 [82.1; 84.2] 12.0 [11.1; 12.9] -6.8 5.8
Metallurgy 2.8 [2.0; 3.6] 83.1 [81.6; 84.7] 14.1 [13.2; 15.0] -9.9 3.6
Furniture and organ building industry 3.9 [3.0; 4.8] 83.1 [81.8; 84.4] 13.0 [11.9; 14.0] -9.6 4.5
Food Industry 5.2 [3.0; 7.4] 82.8 [79.4; 86.2] 12.0 [10.6; 13.4] -18.2 8.1
Construction company Group premium loose 3.3 [2.6; 3.9] 82.7 [81.5; 83.8] 14.1 [13.1; 15.1] -13.1 4.0
Other land and air freight 5.4 [4.7; 6.1] 82.6 [81.7; 83.6] 12.0 [11.1; 12.8] -7.9 5.7
Catering overall Group premium loose 4.9 [4.3; 5.5] 82.4 [81.1; 83.7] 12.7 [11.7; 13.7] -7.3 6.6
Bakeries 4.6 [4.1; 5.2] 82.3 [81.2; 83.5] 13.0 [12.2; 13.9] -8.3 6.2
security firms 6.2 [3.5; 8.9] 82.2 [79.4; 85.0] 11.7 [10.3; 13.0] -9.5 6.1
General Industry 4.1 [3.3; 4.9] 81.2 [78.4; 84.0] 14.7 [12.4; 16.9] -6.3 3.4
Butchers other 6.7 [4.4; 9.0] 80.9 [77.4; 84.5] 12.4 [10.6; 14.2] -8.0 5.9
Government, public utilities 2.2 [1.9; 2.5] 80.8 [77.3; 84.4] 17.0 [13.4; 20.6] -5.5 2.1
Electronic industry 3.4 [1.5; 5.3] 80.5 [76.8; 84.2] 16.1 [13.7; 18.4] -7.3 4.6
Cleaning 6.0 [5.2; 6.9] 80.5 [78.5; 82.5] 13.4 [12.1; 14.8] -8.1 4.6
Havenclassificeerders 6.6 [5.6; 7.7] 80.1 [78.1; 82.2] 13.3 [10.7; 15.8] -4.2 6.8
Telecommunications 10.4 [7.3; 13.5] 80.1 [76.7; 83.5] 9.5 [8.8; 10.2] -6.5 6.3
Taxi and ambulance transport 5.6 [4.5; 6.7] 79.5 [77.4; 81.5] 15.0 [13.7; 16.2] -6.3 4.2
Catering Catering 7.6 [6.0; 9.2] 78.0 [74.5; 81.5] 14.4 [12.4; 16.4] -31.9 16.7
Merchant shiping 8.1 [3.8; 12.4] 77.8 [70.8; 84.7] 14.1 [10.1; 18.1] -29.5 22.4
Loan Companies 10.5 [9.6; 11.3] 75.9 [74.4; 77.5] 13.6 [12.4; 14.8] -18.7 6.6
Plasterers 4.3 [1.5; 7.1] 75.8 [72.7; 78.9] 19.9 [15.2; 24.6] -10.5 4.2
Roofers 6.8 [4.3; 9.4] 73.2 [62.6; 83.7] 20.0 [11.7; 28.3] -13.2 9.3
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
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Figure 4.10: Participation of flexible and fixed contracts




























Figure 4.11: Participation of tenured and untenured contracts
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Figure 4.12: Weekly contract hours
















Next we unpack the contract details of employees and observe further inter-
esting patterns in rigidities of wages across types & terms of contracts. First, in
Figure 4.12 and Table 4.8 we show that the degree of wage rigidity is higher for em-
ployees working for more hours. For instance, while the likelihood of a no-change
for the group of 35+ hours is 85.7%, the same likelihood is 82.6% for employees
working for less than 12 hours a week. The downward rigidity drives a large por-
tion of this difference in wages. Second, Figure 4.13 and Table 4.9 exhibit a clear
positive correlation between “labor flexibility” and “wage flexibility”. Specifically,
wages of more flexible types of labor, such as temporary & on-call workers, is a
lot less rigid compared to regular workers and directors. While the likelihood of
no change in wages is 91.4% for directors, it is 73.9% for temporary workers. This
difference is driven by differences in both downward and upward adjustments in
wages. This observation is very relevant from a macro point of view because there
has been an increase in the number of flexible labor positions in The Netherlands
over the recent years. As Figure 4.14 shows, for instance, the percentage of on-
call workers in the Netherlands more than doubled between 2003 and 2015, going
from 3.8% to 8%, with respect to the total number of workers.
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Table 4.8: Weekly contract hours
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
<12 5.6 [5.3; 5.9] 82.6 [81.9; 83.3] 11.8 [11.3; 12.2] -8.8 9.4
12-<20 3.5 [3.3; 3.7] 84.1 [83.6; 84.6] 12.4 [12.1; 12.8] -8.8 5.4
20-<25 2.7 [2.5; 2.9] 85.2 [84.8; 85.7] 12.1 [11.7; 12.5] -8.6 4.3
25-<30 3.0 [2.7; 3.3] 84.5 [83.8; 85.1] 12.5 [12.0; 13.0] -8.2 4.3
30-<35 2.7 [2.4; 3.0] 84.5 [83.9; 85.0] 12.8 [12.4; 13.2] -8.3 4.1
35 and more 3.0 [2.6; 3.3] 85.7 [85.0; 86.3] 11.4 [10.8; 11.9] -9.6 4.2
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.





































Table 4.9: Type of job
Frequency Average size
Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
Temp agency worker 11.5 [10.6; 12.5] 73.9 [72.6; 75.1] 14.6 [13.7; 15.5] -20.8 5.9
On-call 7.3 [6.8; 7.8] 76.6 [76.0; 77.2] 16.1 [15.6; 16.6] -5.3 5.8
Intern 6.2 [5.5; 6.9] 82.4 [81.0; 83.7] 11.4 [10.3; 12.5] -24.9 22.3
Regular workers 3.0 [2.8; 3.3] 85.0 [84.5; 85.6] 11.9 [11.5; 12.3] -8.8 4.7
Director 3.8 [3.7; 3.9] 91.4 [91.2; 91.6] 4.8 [4.7; 4.9] -15.4 13.3
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
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Source: CBS - Netherlands.
4.6 Wage Rigidity: Time- and State-Dependency
As we have covered in Section 4.2, the well-known theories of state and time de-
pendency propose different underlying reasons for changes in wages. Theories
of state-dependency suggest that the probability of adjustments in wages moves
with the state of the economic environment. Theories of time-dependency, in
turn, argue that this probability depends on the temporal context, given by a spe-
cific period of the year, or the duration of the wage spell - and it is independent
of the economic conditions.
The database at our disposal, with the benefits associated with a high peri-
odicity, high disaggregation and ample information at the level of the employee
as we described in Section 4.4, presents a unique opportunity to test which the-
ory best explains the dynamics of nominal wages in the Netherlands. With this
objective, we estimate the following fixed-effect model for the probability of ob-
serving a change in nominal wages - separately for reductions in wages and wage
increases,
yi ,t =α+q i ,tδ+x i ,tβ + z i ,t γ+υi +εi ,t , (4.1)





1 if wi ,t 6=wi ,t−1
0 if wi ,t =wi ,t−1
where i is the wage trajectory, t is months and w is the nominal hourly wage.14
Equation (4.1) contains variables aimed to capture time- and state-dependent
components of wage changes. Specifically, vector q captures the potential of
time-dependency by including monthly and duration dummies. Vector x prox-
ies the possibility of state-dependency by incorporating factors related to the









and a proxy for accumulated firm productivity, which is given by
the change in the size of the firm - measured in terms of number of employees
 
ne f ,t−1−ne f ,t−τ−1

, with τ−1 being the duration of the wage spell.
15 These vari-
ables measure the accumulated disequilibrium between the optimal wage set at
the beginning of the spell and current wage (Cecchetti (1987)).
The vector z comprises of characteristics of the wage trajectory and the busi-
ness unit, which are employment policy, employment relationship, type of con-
tract, type of relationship, contract hours, type of job, size of the business unit,
and age of the employee.
4.6.1 Results: Time- vs. State-dependency
Table 4.10 shows the results, using the entire sample, in the case of wage in-
creases. Column A shows the estimated values for the model that does not in-
clude dummy variables of duration, while column B includes dummy variables
of duration for up to 12 periods.16
The estimated results confirm the evidence of seasonality in wage changes
mentioned in Section 4.5. In this regard, a Wald test rejects the hypothesis that
the coefficients associated with the monthly dummy variables are jointly not sig-
nificant. The same test rejects the hypothesis that all the coefficients associated
14A wage trajectory is given by yi ≡ ye j f with e representing employee, j employee’s job and f is
business unit. υi represents wage trajectory fixed effects.
15Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) and Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012) include these
variables as well, but in the context of a Tobit type II model that allows them, in addition, to model
the size of wage changes. We have opted for a linear model due to computational constraints asso-
ciated with the size of our sample. However, we verified, using a considerably smaller sample, that
our results are comparable with those obtained with a Probit model, in line with the specification
in Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) and Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012).
16The model includes the complete set of dummy duration variables. Due to space restrictions,
we only show a subset of them.
114 CHAPTER 4. RIGID WAGES AND CONTRACTS IN THE NETHERLANDS
Table 4.10: Probability of a wage increase
Panel A Panel B
Parameter Standard error Parameter Standard error
"Time depedency"
Month
January 0.326*** 0.015 0.281*** 0.013
February 0.069*** 0.005 0.072*** 0.006
March 0.017*** 0.005 0.038*** 0.005
April 0.026*** 0.010 0.062*** 0.009
May 0.000 0.006 0.034*** 0.006
June 0.029*** 0.008 0.055*** 0.007
July 0.1*** 0.015 0.105*** 0.014
August 0.069*** 0.011 0.067*** 0.010
Setpember 0.017*** 0.005 0.025*** 0.005
October 0.019*** 0.004 0.036*** 0.005
November -0.001*** 0.003 0.01*** 0.004
Duration
1 month 0.006* 0.003
2 months 0.025*** 0.004
3 months 0.051*** 0.005
4 months 0.049*** 0.005
5 months 0.066*** 0.006
6 months 0.086*** 0.006
7 months 0.077*** 0.005
8 months 0.087*** 0.006
9 months 0.101*** 0.007
10 months 0.114*** 0.007
11 months 0.399*** 0.015
12 months 0.139*** 0.013
"State dependency"
Accumulated inflation 0.036*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.002
Accumulated unemployment -0.014*** 0.003 -0.03*** 0.003
Accumulated productivity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Employment policy
Part-time -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003
Employment relationship
Flexible 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.006
Type of contract
Not applicable -0.002 0.010 -0.010 0.011
Untenured 0.002 0.004 -0.005 0.005
Type of relationship
Partnership -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.005
Single -0.004** 0.002 -0.002 0.002
age -0.016*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.001
Weekly contract hours
12-<20 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
20-<25 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003
25-<30 -0.007* 0.004 -0.007** 0.004
30-<35 -0.008 0.005 -0.008* 0.005
35 and more -0.034*** 0.007 -0.035*** 0.006
Business size
2 -0.05* 0.026 -0.048* 0.027
3 to 4 -0.051* 0.027 -0.05* 0.028
5 to 9 -0.056** 0.028 -0.057** 0.029
10 to 19 -0.052* 0.029 -0.055* 0.030
20 to 49 -0.051* 0.031 -0.053* 0.032
50 to 99 -0.052 0.033 -0.055 0.035
100 to 149 -0.045 0.036 -0.049 0.037
150 to 199 -0.040 0.038 -0.043 0.039
200 to 249 -0.035 0.039 -0.038 0.041
250 to 499 -0.017 0.042 -0.020 0.044
500 to 999 -0.003 0.045 -0.009 0.047
1000 to 1999 0.028 0.043 0.025 0.045
2000 or more 0.041 0.046 0.043 0.048
Constant 0.727*** 0.057 0.618*** 0.066
Observations 4,707,989 4,707,989
The reference wage trajectory is one from a worker with a full-time contract, fixed hours, tenured, married,
working in a small business unit. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at business unit level. *** Significant
at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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to the months are statistically equal and, instead, as shown in Table 4.10 wage
increases are more likely to occur in January and July.
This pattern in the temporal behavior of wage increases represents evidence
against Calvo’s approach to determining wages (equal probability of observing a
change in each period). The pattern seen in the estimate instead supports the
notion of Taylor time dependence, in which wage changes occur at certain fixed
time periods, and is in line with our findings in the analysis of the hazard func-
tion. The strong statistical significance of the dummy variables of duration, at
1% in almost all cases, reinforces the time-dependency component. It is worth
noting that, unlike Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016), the dummy variables of
duration maintain their effect on the probability of a wage increase even when
the model takes the months into account as an independent variable.
We also find substantial evidence of state dependence. This empirical ob-
servation remains, although with a reduced magnitude in some cases, even after
including duration dummies. In particular, as intuition suggests, we find a pos-
itive and statistically significant relationship between the probability of a wage
increase and accumulated inflation. In the model without duration dummies,
an increase in accumulated inflation of 1 percentage point (pp) increases the
probability of an increase in wages by 3.6%. Once we include the duration dum-
mies, the same change in accumulated inflation increases the probability of an
increase in wages to 0.7%.17
Table 4.10 shows the expected negative sign for the accumulated unemploy-
ment coefficient. Here, and without duration dummies, an increase in accumu-
lated unemployment of 1 pp decreases the probability of an increase in wages
by 1.4%. In contrast to the aforementioned effect for accumulated inflation, in-
cluding duration dummies amplifies the impact of accumulated unemployment.
Specifically, when accumulated unemployment increases by 1 pp, the probability
of an increase in wages decreases by 3.0%.18,19
17In the sample the average accumulated inflation is of 0.81 pp. The 99% percentile is 4.9 pp and
the 1% percentile is -1.0 pp.
18In the sample the average accumulated unemployment is of 0.04 pp. The 99% percentile is 1.4
pp and the 1% percentile is -1.1pp.
19Regarding the controls, Table 4.10 shows that all the variables associated with the different
characteristics of the contracts are not significant. In addition, there is a negative and significant
relationship between the probability of an increase in wages and working hours for those who
work over 25 hours a week. As in Bihan, Montornès and Heckel (2012), we detected weak evidence
(10% of significance) of a negative link between the probability of a wage increase and the size of
the business unit, when it has less than 50 persons employed. In the same line, and confirming
our discussion in Section 4.5, the results show that age negatively affects the probability of a wage
increase.
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Table 4.11 shows the results, using the entire sample, for the case of wage
reductions without (column A) and with (column B) duration dummies.
For wage reductions, we find similar results regarding the statistical signifi-
cance of the seasonality variables and the duration dummies, both supporting
the presence of time dependence. The Wald test rejects the hypothesis of no
joint significance and the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients at 1%. The
seasonal pattern does not present peaks as clear as in the case of wage increases;
wage reductions are more likely to occur in January, but this probability is not
very different from those observed in other months. In addition, it is more likely
to see a wage reduction after a short period without wage changes (four months
or fewer). These last two results are comparable to those found by Sigurdsson
and Sigurdardottir (2016).
Overall, we find evidence of state-dependency which survives the incorpora-
tion of duration variables.20 However, compared to the wage increase scenario,
the effects of macroeconomic variables on the probability of wage reductions are
of lesser magnitude. Specifically, Table 4.11 shows that on average (for models
with and without dummy duration variables), an increase in accumulated infla-
tion of 1 pp increases the probability of a wage reduction by 0.65%. Similarly, an
increase in accumulated unemployment of 1 pp decreases the probability of a
wage reduction by 0.35%.21
4.6.2 Results: Time- vs. State-dependency and contracts
In this section we investigate the time and state component in the probability
of observing changes in wages based on the characteristics of employment con-
tracts.
We find evidence of time dependence for all types of contracts considered. In
this sense, and like when the estimate uses the pooled sample, Table 4.12 shows
that in the case of wage increases, the seasonal pattern is also present when we
break down the data by contractual characteristics.
20In contrast, Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) found that the probability of a wage reduc-
tion does not respond to changes in current accumulated inflation or unemployment.
21Regarding the controls, Table 4.11 shows that, except for tenured workers (with a small positive
relationship with the probability of a wage reduction), the variables associated with the character-
istics of the contracts are not significant. In addition, wage reductions are less likely for workers
who work less than 30 hours and for those who work over 35. We found no evidence of a link be-
tween the probability of a wage reduction and the size of the business unit. On the contrary, Bihan,
Montornès and Heckel (2012) found that this probability is greater in small establishments. There
is a positive but insignificant relationship between age and the possibility of a wage reduction.
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Table 4.11: Probability of a wage reduction
Panel A Panel B
Parameter Standard error Parameter Standard error
"Time depedency"
Month
January 0.029*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005
February -0.023*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003
March -0.019*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.003
April -0.022*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002
May -0.016*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.003
June -0.036*** 0.003 -0.03*** 0.003
July -0.017*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003
August -0.022*** 0.003 -0.016*** 0.003
Setpember -0.025*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.003
October -0.024*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.003
November -0.023*** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003
Duration
1 month 0.024*** 0.001
2 months 0.035*** 0.002
3 months 0.055*** 0.003
4 months 0.043*** 0.002
5 months 0.032*** 0.002
6 months 0.038*** 0.002
7 months 0.032*** 0.002
8 months 0.033*** 0.002
9 months 0.038*** 0.002
10 months 0.029*** 0.002
11 months 0.044*** 0.002
12 months 0.038*** 0.002
"State dependency"
Accumulated inflation 0.009*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
Accumulated unemployment -0.004*** 0.001 -0.003** 0.001
Accumulated productivity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Employment policy
Part-time 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
Employment relationship
Flexible 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Type of contract
Not applicable 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007
Untenured 0.005*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
Type of relationship
Partnership 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
Single -0.004*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001
age 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000
Weekly contract hours
12-<20 -0.014*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.001
20-<25 -0.011*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.002
25-<30 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.009*** 0.003
30-<35 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004
35 and more 0.011** 0.005 0.01** 0.005
Business size
2 -0.011 0.009 -0.010 0.008
3 to 4 -0.010 0.009 -0.010 0.008
5 to 9 -0.006 0.010 -0.007 0.009
10 to 19 -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.009
20 to 49 -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.010
50 to 99 -0.002 0.011 -0.004 0.010
100 to 149 0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.011
150 to 199 0.000 0.013 -0.003 0.012
200 to 249 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.012
250 to 499 0.002 0.014 -0.002 0.013
500 to 999 -0.003 0.015 -0.008 0.014
1000 to 1999 -0.006 0.015 -0.012 0.013
2000 or more 0.007 0.018 0.001 0.017
Constant -0.073*** 0.021 -0.109*** 0.020
Observations 4,316,234 4,316,234
The reference wage trajectory is one from a worker with a full-time contract, fixed hours, tenured, married,
working in a small business unit. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at business unit level. *** Significant
at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The magnitude of the seasonal component for almost all types of contracts is
comparable to the aggregate case mentioned in Subsection 4.6.1 but is less pro-
nounced for wage trajectories with flexible hours. The probability of observing a
wage increase in January and July for workers with flexible hours is 14% and 6%
higher than the probability of observing it in December; for the other contracts,
they are 28% and 10% on average, respectively. In other words, the probability
of observing a wage increase for contracts with flexible hours is flatter during the
year and, therefore, is closer to Calvo?s assumption of equal probability of change
in each period.
We observe something similar regarding the duration variables. For contracts
with flexible hours, the probability of having an increase in wage after 11 months
with no change is 25%. On average, this probability for other types of contracts
is almost double (41%). This observation reinforces again the heterogeneity in
wage adjustments between workers with different contractual terms.
In general, most types of contracts show dependence on the state associated
with accumulated inflation and unemployment. The estimated coefficients have
the expected sign and are similar between the types of contracts and those ob-
tained with the aggregate data (Subsection 4.6.1). In this sense, it is worth high-
lighting some findings, nevertheless.
There are two types of contracts for which the state dependency is associ-
ated only with one of the two macroeconomic variables considered. In particu-
lar, Table 4.12 shows that for contracts with flexible hours there is no significant
relationship between the probability of a wage increase and accumulated unem-
ployment.
Arguably, a stronger dependence on time compensates for this disconnection
from the evolution of unemployment since the coefficients associated with the
duration dummies are greater for workers with flexible hours compared to those
with other types of contracts. Similarly, for fixed-term contracts the probability
of a wage increase does not respond to accumulated inflation and, at the same
time, its relation to accumulated unemployment is of lesser magnitude. In the
case of flexible hours contracts, a stronger response to the duration of the wage
trajectory accompanies this weaker dependency of the state.
The link between the likelihood of a wage increase and accumulated inflation
for full-time contracts is twice as strong as for part-time contracts. Specifically,
while for full-time contracts the positive relationship with accumulated inflation
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Table 4.12: Probability of wage increases by type of contract
Employment policy Employment relationship Type of contract
Full-time Part-time Fixed Flexible Tenured Untenured




January 0.311*** 0.014 0.256*** 0.013 0.285*** 0.014 0.136*** 0.011 0.263*** 0.015 0.285*** 0.015
February 0.08*** 0.009 0.067*** 0.005 0.071*** 0.006 0.1*** 0.025 0.085*** 0.006 0.07*** 0.007
March 0.036*** 0.007 0.042*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.005 0.042*** 0.009 0.043*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.005
April 0.073*** 0.012 0.053*** 0.006 0.062*** 0.009 0.045*** 0.010 0.064*** 0.014 0.062*** 0.009
May 0.027*** 0.006 0.041*** 0.007 0.034*** 0.006 0.041*** 0.013 0.055*** 0.006 0.03*** 0.007
June 0.064*** 0.011 0.049*** 0.006 0.056*** 0.008 0.033*** 0.012 0.048*** 0.005 0.058*** 0.009
July 0.101*** 0.011 0.11*** 0.017 0.106*** 0.014 0.063*** 0.013 0.1*** 0.011 0.108*** 0.015
August 0.055*** 0.010 0.08*** 0.011 0.069*** 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.069*** 0.015 0.068*** 0.011
Setpember 0.019*** 0.007 0.032*** 0.004 0.025*** 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.035*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.006
October 0.035*** 0.006 0.038*** 0.005 0.037*** 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.042*** 0.005 0.036*** 0.005
November 0.004 0.005 0.016*** 0.004 0.01*** 0.004 0.036 0.025 0.023*** 0.005 0.008** 0.004
Duration
1 month -0.002 0.005 0.014*** 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.04*** 0.003 0.02*** 0.004 0.003 0.004
2 months 0.016*** 0.006 0.036*** 0.003 0.023*** 0.004 0.075*** 0.007 0.046*** 0.007 0.022*** 0.004
3 months 0.042*** 0.007 0.064*** 0.004 0.049*** 0.005 0.092*** 0.005 0.074*** 0.007 0.048*** 0.005
4 months 0.042*** 0.006 0.062*** 0.004 0.048*** 0.005 0.086*** 0.006 0.079*** 0.006 0.046*** 0.005
5 months 0.074*** 0.008 0.064*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.006 0.106*** 0.007 0.107*** 0.011 0.061*** 0.006
6 months 0.08*** 0.007 0.1*** 0.006 0.085*** 0.006 0.117*** 0.009 0.109*** 0.006 0.086*** 0.007
7 months 0.077*** 0.006 0.085*** 0.005 0.075*** 0.005 0.125*** 0.009 0.122*** 0.006 0.073*** 0.005
8 months 0.083*** 0.008 0.098*** 0.006 0.085*** 0.006 0.176*** 0.028 0.142*** 0.008 0.082*** 0.007
9 months 0.102*** 0.009 0.109*** 0.006 0.1*** 0.007 0.149*** 0.012 0.172*** 0.012 0.094*** 0.007
10 months 0.107*** 0.008 0.13*** 0.008 0.113*** 0.007 0.166*** 0.012 0.2*** 0.014 0.106*** 0.007
11 months 0.417*** 0.017 0.388*** 0.015 0.399*** 0.015 0.254*** 0.027 0.454*** 0.028 0.398*** 0.015




0.01*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.002 0.007** 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.009*** 0.002
inflation
Accumulated
-0.028*** 0.004 -0.031*** 0.003 -0.03*** 0.003 -0.008 0.007 -0.023*** 0.003 -0.031*** 0.003
unemployment
Accumulated




Partnership -0.01* 0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.005 0.005 -0.017 0.038 0.001 0.013 -0.008 0.006
Single -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.013 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.002
age -0.015*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.001 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.02*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002
Weekly
contract hours
12-<20 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003
20-<25 -0.005* 0.003 -0.006* 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.006* 0.003
25-<30 -0.011*** 0.004 -0.01** 0.004 0.008 0.006 -0.001 0.004 -0.011** 0.004
30-<35 -0.015** 0.007 -0.013*** 0.004 -0.01** 0.005 0.017** 0.008 0.002 0.004 -0.011** 0.006
35 and more -0.054*** 0.009 -0.045*** 0.005 -0.036*** 0.005 0.010 0.008 -0.024*** 0.005 -0.037*** 0.006
Business size
2 -0.020 0.013 -0.079* 0.048 -0.045* 0.025 -0.115* 0.059 -0.119*** 0.046 -0.025** 0.012
3 to 4 -0.025* 0.013 -0.081 0.049 -0.048* 0.026 -0.117* 0.062 -0.124*** 0.047 -0.025** 0.012
5 to 9 -0.03** 0.013 -0.091* 0.051 -0.054** 0.027 -0.141** 0.064 -0.13*** 0.049 -0.033*** 0.012
10 to 19 -0.029** 0.013 -0.09* 0.053 -0.053* 0.028 -0.13* 0.068 -0.132*** 0.051 -0.03** 0.013
20 to 49 -0.025* 0.014 -0.092 0.058 -0.052* 0.030 -0.124* 0.075 -0.137** 0.054 -0.026** 0.013
50 to 99 -0.022 0.015 -0.099 0.063 -0.053 0.032 -0.128 0.081 -0.156*** 0.060 -0.023* 0.014
100 to 149 -0.015 0.016 -0.096 0.068 -0.047 0.034 -0.126 0.083 -0.158** 0.065 -0.015 0.015
150 to 199 -0.013 0.017 -0.085 0.072 -0.040 0.036 -0.089 0.092 -0.168** 0.072 -0.005 0.016
200 to 249 0.003 0.018 -0.085 0.075 -0.035 0.038 -0.194* 0.100 -0.163** 0.075 0.003 0.017
250 to 499 0.015 0.017 -0.066 0.079 -0.017 0.040 -0.125 0.106 -0.161* 0.088 0.023 0.016
500 to 999 0.034*** 0.012 -0.061 0.084 -0.005 0.043 -0.176 0.130 -0.196* 0.108 0.038*** 0.014
1000 to 1999 0.058*** 0.012 -0.021 0.084 0.031 0.041 -0.174 0.133 -0.151 0.105 0.072*** 0.016
2000 or more 0.073*** 0.014 0.001 0.088 0.049 0.044 -0.193 0.135 -0.153 0.110 0.092*** 0.024
Constant 0.656*** 0.069 0.649*** 0.085 0.61*** 0.066 0.944*** 0.102 0.847*** 0.067 0.61*** 0.066
Observations 2,242,959 2,465,030 4,579,206 128,783 835,661 3,816,496
Standard errors clustered at business unit level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5
percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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is one to one, an increase of the latter by 1 percentage point only increases the
probability of a wage increase for part-time contracts by 0.5%.22
Table 4.13 shows the estimated results, disaggregated by type of contracts, for
the case of wage reductions.
With the exception of flexible-hours contracts, which show a decrease in the
probability of observing a wage reduction in January (with respect to Decem-
ber), the observed seasonality pattern is similar to that analyzed in Subsection
4.6.1. The negative relationship between the probability of a wage reduction and
the variable associated with the months is considerably stronger throughout the
year for this type of contract. The link between this probability and the duration
variables is also stronger for flexible-hours contracts (on average it is three times
higher).
The probability of a wage reduction also presents a component of state de-
pendence, particularly evident for part-time and tenured contracts. Compared
with the other types of contracts, the former shows a negative effect of accumu-
lated unemployment that is almost 1.5 times higher. Likewise, the positive ef-
fect of accumulated inflation for tenured contracts is almost double that of con-
tracts with other characteristics. On the contrary, for full-time and tenured con-
tracts, accumulated unemployment does not affect the probability of a wage re-
duction.23
4.7 Concluding Remarks
Nominal wage rigidities not only impede the achievement of an optimal alloca-
tion of resources but also exacerbate unwanted fluctuations in unemployment
and output, among other macroeconomic variables. These negative repercus-
sions open the door to monetary policy interventions, which, however, can only
counteract their effects when the determinants and magnitude of nominal wage
rigidities are understood and measured correctly.
Understanding the way in which nominal wages are determined and the pos-
sible frictions that prevent them from adjusting to their optimum levels is, there-
fore, an important task for macroeconomists. However, only recently available
databases, with high periodicity and a high level of disaggregation, have allowed
22In regard to the controls, Table 4.12 shows that only for tenured contracts the size of the busi-
ness unit has a significant (negative) relationship with the probability of a wage increase.
23In general, there is a negative relationship between the hours worked per week and the prob-
ability of a wage reduction. This is stronger for flexible-hours contracts.
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Table 4.13: Probability of wage reductions by type of contract
Employment policy Employment relationship Type of contract
Full-time Part-time Fixed Flexible Tenured Untenured




January 0.034*** 0.006 0.022*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 -0.014 0.008 0.015*** 0.005 0.031*** 0.005
February -0.014*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.003 -0.042*** 0.005 -0.01*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003
March -0.014*** 0.003 -0.01*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 -0.051*** 0.006 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.01*** 0.003
April -0.013*** 0.003 -0.017*** 0.003 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.059*** 0.005 -0.023*** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.003
May -0.009*** 0.003 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 -0.062*** 0.006 -0.021*** 0.004 -0.01*** 0.003
June -0.032*** 0.004 -0.029*** 0.003 -0.03*** 0.003 -0.059*** 0.005 -0.04*** 0.004 -0.028*** 0.003
July -0.014*** 0.004 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.01*** 0.003 -0.049*** 0.006 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.01*** 0.003
August -0.021*** 0.004 -0.011*** 0.003 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.054*** 0.006 -0.018*** 0.004 -0.015*** 0.003
Setpember -0.025*** 0.004 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.056*** 0.006 -0.023*** 0.004 -0.018*** 0.003
October -0.025*** 0.004 -0.016*** 0.003 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.056*** 0.005 -0.026*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.004
November -0.028*** 0.004 -0.016*** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.028*** 0.005 -0.024*** 0.003 -0.021*** 0.004
Duration
1 month 0.02*** 0.001 0.027*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.001 0.073*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.001
2 months 0.028*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.122*** 0.005 0.057*** 0.003 0.03*** 0.002
3 months 0.05*** 0.003 0.06*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 0.142*** 0.006 0.083*** 0.005 0.048*** 0.003
4 months 0.033*** 0.002 0.054*** 0.003 0.041*** 0.002 0.123*** 0.005 0.067*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.002
5 months 0.027*** 0.002 0.039*** 0.002 0.03*** 0.002 0.128*** 0.008 0.059*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.002
6 months 0.03*** 0.003 0.047*** 0.002 0.035*** 0.002 0.128*** 0.010 0.064*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.003
7 months 0.025*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002 0.03*** 0.001 0.121*** 0.010 0.058*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.001
8 months 0.026*** 0.002 0.042*** 0.003 0.031*** 0.002 0.127*** 0.009 0.058*** 0.004 0.028*** 0.002
9 months 0.028*** 0.002 0.05*** 0.003 0.036*** 0.002 0.111*** 0.011 0.065*** 0.005 0.033*** 0.002
10 months 0.023*** 0.002 0.036*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.002 0.104*** 0.011 0.06*** 0.004 0.024*** 0.002
11 months 0.041*** 0.003 0.047*** 0.003 0.041*** 0.002 0.117*** 0.013 0.068*** 0.005 0.037*** 0.002




0.006*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
inflation
Accumulated
-0.001 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.009** 0.005 -0.003 0.002 -0.002** 0.001
unemployment
Accumulated




Partnership -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.079 0.012 0.008 0.000 0.003
Single -0.004*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.024** 0.012 0.001 0.003 -0.004*** 0.001
age 0.002*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.01*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000
Weekly
contract hours
12-<20 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.01*** 0.001 -0.024*** 0.004 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.009*** 0.002
20-<25 -0.008*** 0.003 -0.006** 0.002 -0.032*** 0.005 -0.025*** 0.003 -0.004 0.003
25-<30 -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.044*** 0.005 -0.026*** 0.004 -0.002 0.003
30-<35 0.018*** 0.004 0.01** 0.005 0.008* 0.004 -0.058*** 0.007 -0.018*** 0.005 0.01** 0.004
35 and more 0.033*** 0.005 0.016** 0.007 0.017*** 0.006 -0.047*** 0.007 -0.006 0.006 0.019*** 0.006
Business size
2 -0.007 0.009 -0.005 0.006 -0.009 0.008 -0.007 0.021 0.004 0.009 -0.016* 0.008
3 to 4 -0.007 0.009 -0.006 0.006 -0.009 0.008 -0.007 0.020 0.008 0.008 -0.016* 0.008
5 to 9 -0.005 0.010 0.000 0.006 -0.006 0.008 -0.004 0.020 0.010 0.008 -0.014 0.009
10 to 19 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.007 -0.003 0.009 0.008 0.021 0.012 0.008 -0.010 0.009
20 to 49 -0.002 0.010 0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.009 0.024 0.022 0.009 0.009 -0.011 0.009
50 to 99 -0.003 0.011 0.004 0.008 -0.005 0.010 0.035 0.027 0.014 0.010 -0.013 0.010
100 to 149 -0.002 0.012 0.010 0.008 -0.002 0.011 0.040 0.028 0.02* 0.011 -0.011 0.010
150 to 199 -0.002 0.012 0.008 0.008 -0.004 0.011 0.050 0.031 0.023** 0.011 -0.015 0.011
200 to 249 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.012 0.075 0.054 0.043*** 0.014 -0.013 0.011
250 to 499 -0.005 0.013 0.010 0.009 -0.004 0.012 0.049 0.035 0.016 0.011 -0.013 0.011
500 to 999 -0.016 0.013 0.007 0.009 -0.010 0.013 0.065** 0.026 0.005 0.010 -0.018 0.011
1000 to 1999 -0.024** 0.012 0.007 0.010 -0.014 0.013 0.047* 0.027 0.003 0.010 -0.021* 0.011
2000 or more -0.013 0.019 0.023 0.015 -0.001 0.017 0.073*** 0.027 0.029 0.018 -0.009 0.016
Constant -0.091*** 0.020 -0.134*** 0.019 -0.112*** 0.020 -0.285*** 0.057 -0.18*** 0.031 -0.108*** 0.020
Observations 2,054,190 2,262,044 4,195,818 120,416 771,440 3,489,291
Standard errors clustered at business unit level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5
percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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us to overcome the previous difficulties associated with understanding and mea-
suring the dynamics of nominal wage changes.
This paper helps shed some light on the determinants and magnitude of
nominal wage rigidities. We explored the dynamics of nominal wage rigidities in
the Netherlands using a high frequency micro database with monthly informa-
tion on nominal wages and the characteristics of the employment contracts of
all employees in the period 2006-2012.
Several results stand out. We documented a clear seasonal pattern in the de-
gree of nominal wage rigidity and a momentary increase in this rigidity immedi-
ately after the recent financial crisis. Our results also show a significant variability
in the frequency of nominal wage changes in the different sectors, according to
the size of the business unit and according to the age of the employee. In ad-
dition, we found that the hazard function has two peaks, one at 12 months and
another at 24 months.
More importantly, and as a unique contribution, we find that certain char-
acteristics of labor contracts play a role in determining the degree of nominal
wage rigidity. In particular, characteristics such as the type of job, the working
time, the duration of the contract and the status of the employee are an impor-
tant source of heterogeneity in the nominal wage rigidity. As far as we know, this
is the first time that the relationship between these contractual characteristics
and the nominal wage rigidity is empirically uncovered.
In addition, our analysis provides evidence in favor of the theories of time-
and state-dependence in the determination of nominal wages. We find that the
probability of a change in the nominal wage depends on the duration of the wage
trajectory (and the specific month of the year) but also on the evolution of ag-
gregate macroeconomic variables (unemployment and inflation). This result is
maintained, in general, when we perform the analysis separately for the different
types of contracts, with some exceptions. In this sense, we find, on the one hand,
that the probability of a wage increase in flexible hours contracts and in tenured
contracts only responds to one of the two macroeconomic variables considered:
inflation and unemployment, respectively. On the other hand, our results show
that the probability of a nominal wage increase in full-time contracts shows a
considerably higher response to changes in inflation and unemployment com-
pared to the way part-time contracts respond.
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Figure 4.15: Macroeconomic series for The Netherlands
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Table 4.14: Distribution of contracts based on wage trajectory
Director Intern SWS-er Temp. workers On-call Rest
Total
NA T U T U T U T U T U
Full-time
Fixed hours 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 16.0 36.7 54.5
Flexible hours 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.2
Part-time
Fixed hours 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 13.9 23.5 38.0
Flexible hours 0.5 0.1 2.6 2.2 5.3
Total 1.5
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.2 3.2 2.7 29.9 60.2
0.4 0.6 1.6 5.9 90.1
% working
0.3
0.8 1.0 0.1 12.2 7.6 1.7 1.8 3.0 6.2
4.8
overtime 0.9 0.1 11.6 1.7 5.0
T: Tenured, U: Untenured, NA: Not aplicable. The total number of wage trajectories is 567,130. All the numbers
are percentages.
Table 4.15: Distribution of contracts based on observations
Director Intern SWS-er Temp. workers On-call Rest
Total
NA T U T U T U T U T U
Full-time
Fixed hours 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 8.9 36.5 47.4
Flexible hours 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
Part-time
Fixed hours 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 10.7 37.4 49.0
Flexible hours 0.3 0.0 1.3 1.5 3.1
Total 1.6
0.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.1 1.4 1.6 19.6 73.9
0.1 1.3 0.6 3.0 93.5
% working
0.4
2.3 2.9 0.0 0.0 14.1 12.3 2.1 2.4 5.7 7.7
6.9
overtime 2.6 0.0 13.8 2.2 7.3
T: Tenured, U: Untenured, NA: Not aplicable. The total number of observations is 13,174,294. All the numbers
are percentages.
4.8. APPENDIX 125
Table 4.16: Number of observations lost in each step of the data cleaning process
(5% sample)





Elimination of percentiles 1%
and 99%
21,327,537 187,625
Possible elimination of the first
and last observation per wage
trajectory
20,623,277 704,260
Elimination of wage trajectories





Correction of wage trajectories
with a “V” or inverted-“V”
shape
14,905,628 0





Decrease No change Increase Decrease Increase
Private companies 4.1 [3.9; 4.3] 84.4 [84.0; 84.8] 11.5 [11.0; 12.0] -9.0 5.5
Subsidized sector 2.7 [2.2; 3.2] 83.7 [82.7; 84.7] 13.6 [12.9; 14.3] -8.7 4.1
Education 1.8 [1.5; 2.1] 87.1 [86.3; 88.0] 11.1 [10.5; 11.6] -12.5 5.4
Municipalities 1.1 [0.9; 1.4] 87.6 [87.2; 88.0] 11.3 [11.0; 11.6] -4.7 2.4
Marginal effects from multinomial logit models. All the numbers are percentages, and rows sum up to a 100%.
Confidence intervals in brackets. The last two columns represents the percentage change in nominal wage,
conditional on a wage decrease or increase. The total number of observations is 13,174,294.
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